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BACKGROUND
This Sinhala and Tamil press review, conducted under
the aegis of the second Strategic Conflict Assessment
(SCA2), "Aid, Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka"
(Goodhand and Klem, 2005), sought to capture local
perspectives on the island's protracted conflict and
Norwegian-brokered peace process as reflected in the
vernacular press. While many local actors have been
subject to closer scrutiny in relation to Sri Lanka's
politics and peace process, there has been insufficient
focus on the role of the vernacular media. Sri Lanka's
English language media has understandably been more
"visible" to international and local actors. However, all
major actors--including successive governments, the
LTTE, major political parties, and Sri Lanka's powerful
Buddhist clergy, among others-- have advanced their
political positions through the vernacular press. This
study is therefore an effort to explore the attitudes of Sri
Lanka's Sinhala and Tamil language print media toward
the Norwegian-brokered peace process and to gauge
their possible impact on it. It is situated in the general
political context outlined in the findings of the second
Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Survey (KAPS II) on
the Sri Lankan Peace Process, conducted by Social
Indicator (which is associated with the Centre for Policy
Alternatives, Colombo). Excluded from this analysis of
vernacular media and public opinion are the role of the
electronic (radio, television, and internet) media, the
role of diaspora media, and the role of LTTE-run media
both on the island and abroad. A study that incorporates
all of these media would be vast and is beyond the scope
of this report.
Drawing mainly on the archives of the Daily Resume,
which provides clippings (translations of headlines and
summaries of stories and editorials) from Sinhala and
Tamil newspapers, this study seeks to summarize
observable themes in attitudes on key issues that could
be relevant to SCA2. It focuses on the time period after
the February 2002 ceasefire between the Sri Lankan
government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) until the Indian Ocean tsunami of December
26, 2004, with particular emphasis on 2003 and 2004.
While a limited period has been selected for study, it is
sufficiently wide to identify important trends, with a
focus on general themes being maintained. This report is
divided into seven sections: (1) an introduction; (2) an
outline of the methodology; (3) a summary of the KAPS
II survey; (4) overall themes observed in media coverage;
(5) a discussion of six sites of study selected for closer
examination; (6) an analysis of the observed themes and
their driving factors; (7) a concluding summary. The
KAPS II findings are outlined within this study to
provide a context in which identified trends in press
coverage can be situated, and include overall trends as
well as those revealed when the sample was divided by
ethnic identity.
MAIN FINDINGS
An examination of Sri Lanka's vernacular press revealed
a multi-faceted and gradually deepening ethnic divide,
particularly on issues related to the peace process--
despite common ground on some issues (like crime and
corruption).  Few areas of cross-ethnic commonality are
highlighted; and there is a zero-sum approach to issues
connected to the peace process, particularly when it
comes to other communities' political goals (especially
in relation to territory and power sharing). The
communal polarization is underlined most strongly in
Executive Summary
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the papers' occasional characterizations of the island's
communities: there is a clear "essentializing of
ethnicity", where Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims are
spoken of as monolithic wholes. Whereas there was
broad support for the peace process among all three
sectors in the wake of the February 2002 ceasefire,
waning optimism and emerging anxieties have since
produced opposition and resistance. Among the
minority papers there was strong support for autonomy
based on minority identities, though on occasion there
were pluralist arguments. 
Vernacular press coverage has, since February 2002, been
noticeably shaped by nationalist ideologies and, in some
cases, racist sentiments. Almost all leading Sinhala
papers have adopted strong Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist
positions. The Tamil press has seen a narrowing and
shifting to the right of positions on the peace process
and the Tamil question in general. Sinhala papers'
suspicion and hostility toward the LTTE have remained
undiminished and have deeply colored coverage and
analysis of the peace process. Tamil papers (with one
prominent exception) generally have not questioned,
and have sometimes defended, the LTTE's bona fides.
Compared with negotiating positions adopted by the
LTTE and the government, the Tamil press has echoed
LTTE positions while the Sinhala press has broadly
reflected the government's and the military's stances on
issues of contention. Since shortly after February 2002,
the Muslim press has increasingly taken a critical, even
hostile, position on the LTTE amid anxieties of being
marginalized by both the government and the LTTE.
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL DONORS
This study thus suggests that there are serious challenges
to be met when promoting the peace process. To begin
with, Sri Lanka's vernacular media must be taken more
seriously as opinion-makers by international actors.
Assisting the building of multi-lingual capacity would
help in the longer term, but the proactive provision of
information in Sinhala and Tamil, as well as in English,
is a vital first step. International actors in Sri Lanka
would probably be best served to build their own
capacities by engaging with all sections of the vernacular
media, but care must be taken not to strip local media
of skilled personnel as a consequence. The prevalence of
nationalist discourses and, in particular, the perception
of the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE as representing
Sinhala and Tamil interests respectively, means that other
actors' interactions with them pose unavoidable risks.
Amid the zero-sum approaches, comments on local
actors and developments (especially praise and
condemnation) must be expressed with care. This is not
simply a question of reproducing or reinforcing local
discourses and any attendant prejudices, but being
sensitive to their existence, even while seeking ways to
confront them. Acknowledging the role of local media in
the peace process, international actors can engage with
the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, on its behalf.
Security for journalists is a pressing issue and ought to
be raised with both actors. The role of state media in
undermining peacebuilding initiatives deserves closer
scrutiny, as does government support for private media,
particularly publications "fostering a dialogue of hatred."
On the one hand, Sri Lanka has an active and
courageous media. Despite the security risks, poor
salaries, and difficult working conditions, journalists
continue to work. On the other hand, the media can be
seen to contribute to the perpetuation of nationalist and
racist sentiments, ethnic stereotyping, and the
promotion of zero-sum approaches to the peace process.
The complex of editorial controls--fear, political
patronage, personal loyalties, and prejudices--provides
no single or easy solution. However, some of these
issues-especially the paucity of training, funding, and
security-are malleable to international actors'
interventions. While there are difficulties in this regard,
and the results may be slow in coming, the emergence of
a robust, professional and ethical media and associated
culture would ultimately be invaluable to promoting
peace in Sri Lanka.
The protracted conflict in Sri Lanka remains one of the
world's most intractable. Even the ongoing Norwegian-
brokered effort, sometimes described as "the best chance
yet"1 to resolve one of South Asia's longest wars,
continues at the time of writing to be bedeviled by
recurrent acrimony and antagonism between the Sri
Lankan government and the LTTE. Moreover, as the
2001 SCA noted, Sri Lanka's conflict "is the result of a
complex mix of factors, which have changed and
mutated over time" (Goodhand, 2001). The same might
be said of the dynamics of the Norwegian initiative,
which has seen new opposing and supportive forces
emerge since the peace process began in earnest in 2002
with the ascension to power of the newly elected United
National Front (UNF) government. The ceasefire signed
by the LTTE and the government in February that year
and subsequent progress in the peace process has
widened the field--admittedly to varying and contestable
degrees--for a number of local participants (including
political parties, local non-governmental organizations,
other "civil society" actors, and the media) to engage
with and influence the politics of peace. Notably, and of
particular relevance to this study, there have been
significant changes in the dynamics of news coverage in
Sri Lanka since 2001. The UNF's lifting in early 2002
of heavy restrictions (including strict censorship and a
ban on correspondents from entering LTTE-controlled
areas) imposed by earlier Sri Lankan administrations has
arguably improved the media's ability to report and
comment on, and thereby impact on the Norwegian
peace process. But other difficulties, including violence
against journalists, have remained and other forms of
editorial control continue.2
While many local actors have been subject to closer
scrutiny in relation to Sri Lanka's politics and peace
process, the role of the vernacular media has drawn
insufficient focus. Sri Lanka's English language media
has understandably been more "visible" to international
and local actors. However all major actors--including
successive governments, the LTTE, major political
parties and Sri Lanka's powerful Buddhist clergy, among
others--conduct substantial politics in the vernacular.
Indeed, the point has often been raised that Sri Lanka's
political undercurrents cannot be ascertained without
studying actors' stances in the different languages.
Crucially, as Sri Lankan journalists brought to the
attention of Reporters Sans Frontiers (RSF), there are
"dangers to peace … posed by the differences in content
from one publication language to another" (2004a, p.
9). Moreover, the spectacular electoral success
(particularly in rural areas) of political parties
campaigning on various positions on peace and the
peace process, suggest the vernacular press should not be
overlooked when seeking a more nuanced understanding
of Sri Lanka's politics. This is not, of course, to say the
media is central to opinion formation. Indeed, grassroots
networks, localized ethnic and religious interplays, and
other factors also play significant roles. But with most
Sri Lankans educated in the vernacular, the influence of
the non-English press on public opinion cannot be
ignored.
This study is, therefore, an effort to explore the attitudes
of Sri Lanka's Sinhala and Tamil language print media
toward the Norwegian-brokered peace process and to
gauge their possible impact on it. Key aspects thereby
7 |  Introduction
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1 As several news reports by Reuters in 2002 and 2003 described the Norwegian initiative.
2 In a 2004 survey and investigation, Reporters without Borders said it "interviewed dozens of journalists. The majority expressed their apprehensions and
frustrations in dealing with a situation that has become much too volatile for them to assert that press freedom is a given in the country." See Reporteurs
Sans Frontier (2004) Sri Lanka: Nine recommendations for improving the state of press freedom (RSF, Paris).
excluded from this analysis of vernacular media and
public opinion are the role of the electronic media
(radio, television, and internet), the role of diaspora
media, and the role of LTTE-run media both on the
island and abroad. A study that incorporates all of these
would be vast and is beyond the scope of this report, but
the impact other media have should be borne in mind.
Given the role accorded diaspora communities in Sri
Lanka's conflict, some observations on expatriate media
are in order. Almost all of Sri Lanka's Tamil, Sinhala,
and English language newspapers are accessible via the
internet, and many have small circulations in diaspora
centers. There is a raft of Tamil diaspora publications
(the LTTE itself is said to field over 20 newspapers and
magazines and there are dozens of small independent
ones), but most have localized circulation and influence-
-though there are exceptions.3 More significant than
diaspora print media, in terms of reach, is the growth of
several satellite-based television channels (including
those run by the LTTE that compete for market share
with Tamil Nadu-based satellite channels) catering to
expatriate Indians and Sri Lankan Tamils. 
The study is situated in the general political context
outlined in the findings of the second Knowledge,
Attitudes and Practices Survey (KAPS II) on the Sri
Lankan Peace Process, conducted by Social Indicator
(which is associated with the Centre for Policy
Alternatives, Colombo).4 The KAPS II survey, "aimed to
determine the changes in public opinion that might
have occurred in Sri Lanka in response to the events of
the past year" (Social Indicator, 2004, p. 4). Its
nationwide sample of 3,515 respondents was drawn
from 21 districts in Sri Lanka, excluding only those areas
in Amparai, Batticoloa, Trincomalee, and Jaffna not
under government control.5 As we shall see, the survey
picks up significant trends, including--paradoxically,
after several years of ceasefire and peace --increasing
polarization between Sri Lanka's majority and minority
communities.
This media study will seek to identify echoes and
dissonance between press coverage and public attitudes
and attempt to analyze their causes. It is structured into
six sections as follows: an outline of the methodology
adopted, a summary of the salient findings of the KAPS
II survey, overall themes observed in media coverage, a
discussion of six sites selected for closer examination, an
analysis of the observed themes and their driving factors,
and a concluding summary. The KAPS II findings are
outlined within this study to provide a context in which
identified trends in press coverage can be situated, and
they include overall trends, as well as those revealed
when the sample is divided by ethnic identity. The
section on overall themes in media draws together
identifiable positions taken by the vernacular media on
the peace process and major actors in it, including the
LTTE, the UNF, other political parties, the international
community, etc. The six sites selected for a more detailed
examination of media coverage are discussed in the next
section, with a brief outline of the specific KAPS II
context that prompted each site's selection. The analysis
of the observed themes in the following section
considers possible driving factors and the concluding
summary considers implications for the peace process.
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3 The English language Tamil Guardian, for example, is seen as closely reflecting LTTE thinking on the peace process and related issues. It is printed in Britain,
Australia, and Canada.
4 See Social Indicator (2004) "Potential for Peace: Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Survey on the Sri Lankan Peace Process" (KAPS II) (Centre for Policy
Alternatives, Colombo).
5 "The results were weighted by ethnic group and region to create a national probability sample… Minority ethnic groups are systematically over-sampled
to insure sufficient numbers for meaningful analysis." (Social Indicator, 2004, p.10).
2. Methodology
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Sri Lanka has had an eventful four years since the last
SCA study was conducted. A permanent ceasefire came
into being. There were two changes in government,
from the People's Alliance (PA) to the pro-peace UNF,
and then from the UNF to the rightwing United
People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA). The first direct peace
talks in seven years between the Sri Lankan state and the
LTTE began, and six months later came to a halt.
Campaigning against the peace process, the third largest
party in Sri Lankan politics, the ultra-nationalist Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), expanded its parliamentary
strength and came to power in a ruling coalition. At the
time of writing, the JVP had exited the UPFA (in
protest of President Kumaratunga's intent to sign an aid-
sharing mechanism with the LTTE), leaving the
minority government to limp on. A Sinhala nationalist
party fielding Buddhist monks as candidates, the Jathika
Hela Urumaya (JHU) emerged and did surprisingly well
at the polls. A coalition of Sri Lanka's main Tamil
parties, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), shifted
politically to explicitly back the LTTE. Calling for an
endorsement of the LTTE's proposals for an interim
administration (ISGA) in its election manifesto, the
Tamil National Alliance (TNA) also swept the polls in
Tamil areas and thus came to dominate Tamil
parliamentary politics. The LTTE has seen increasing
levels of interaction with the international community,
including representatives of many key states,
international organizations, and NGOs. The LTTE
expanded its political activity both within areas it
controls and, more importantly, army-controlled areas.
The LTTE put down a rebellion by a senior commander
in the eastern province, but paramilitary violence in the
region sharply escalated. Although the February 2002
ceasefire has held (and shows no sign of imminent
collapse, despite occasional press characterization as such)
simmering violence in the East remains a persistent
threat, with the continued killings of LTTE members,
military intelligence officers, and army informants.
Several Sinhala and Tamil language newspapers are
published daily in Sri Lanka, and several more among
the diaspora. Given the vast amount of material
available, the study draws mainly on the archives of the
Daily Resume, a daily English language publication that
provides clippings (translations of headlines and
summaries of stories and editorials) from the leading
newspapers in Sri Lanka.6 The study considered
publications' emphasis and perspective in terms of what
dominated the front pages and editorial columns of
newspapers, and the relative weight thus accorded to
issues. Crucially, state-run newspapers were not looked
at in the study; their relatively smaller circulation
compared with the rest of the newspapers in the relevant
vernacular sets suggests that other media, especially
television, are more important components of state
media. As a whole, the strictly controlled state media is
an important opinion former.7 Indeed, RSF noted last
year: "the state media, which have been controlled by
President Chandrika Kumaratunga since November
2003, have extensively conveyed the ideas of her party
and those of her political allies." But, as RSF also notes,
"news coverage of the last election campaign by the state
and private media was unfair" (2004a, p.6, emphasis
added). There are, thus, important lessons on the peace
process to be gained from studying the private media.
6 Although the Daily Resume is very frequent, it is not always a daily publication, with up to three- or four-day gaps at times. Furthermore, on occasion it may
not cover Tamil publications on the day, though readers are usually advised of the cause - staff shortage, etc - by the editor, Janath Tillekeratne.
7 Moreover, the UNF did not have access to state media immediately before winning the 2001 election or the one it lost (in 2004), during which times President
Chandrika Kumaratunga had control of it.
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Rather than an exhaustive tracing of the coverage of the
conflict and peace process, this review will seek to
summarize observable themes in attitudes on key issues
that could be relevant to SCA2. The study's data
collation phase, conducted in early 2005, focused on the
time period after the February 2002 ceasefire until the
Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004, with
particular emphasis on 2003 and 2004.8 Regrettably, the
practical necessity of limiting the time frame considered
means there is a possibility that insight from outside this
period might be missed (for example, lessons from the
press coverage of the politics surrounding the joint aid
mechanism this year are not included). However, the
study's broad focus on general themes in the peace
process mitigates against this. Moreover, the continuity
in the positions and attitudes of various actors in Sri
Lanka's politics increases confidence that sharp deviation
from trends observed in the vernacular press is not likely.
Before proceeding, however, a note of caution on the
material used. As specified at the outset, the contents of
the Daily Resume were taken as the limits of the available
material for this study (with daily context also being
provided by clippings from English language
newspapers).9 Unless otherwise noted in the Resume, if a
topic is not included under a newspaper's summary for
the day, it is assumed that it was either not covered, or
not sufficiently distinctive from other papers in its
vernacular category on the day, or did not vary
sufficiently from the paper's past reporting on the issue
to warrant inclusion. Furthermore, the accuracy of the
translations is assumed (grammatical errors
notwithstanding). These (unfortunately unavoidable)
assumptions inevitably result in a vulnerability to the
editing decisions made in the production of these daily
summaries. However, the Daily Resume's customary
focus on the important topics of the day, including
peace process/conflict-related items, and the study's
focus on general themes should mitigate against this. It
should also be recognized that it is beyond the scope of
this study to examine the veracity of the press coverage.
Indeed, inaccuracy and a proclivity for hyperbole are not
uncommon, as is, on occasion (particularly among
smaller, party-run publications), unabashed
misinformation. The emphasis here is on attitudes on
matters related to the peace process.
As noted above, the themes identified in this study were
drawn from examining coverage through the post-2002
period. In order to illustrate these, this study details six
issues that were, or were perceived, as significant to the
peace process and to the dynamics of the conflict. These
sites of study implicitly or explicitly encapsulate an
important local debate that very often, though not
always, reflects divergent perspectives in Sinhala and
Tamil media. They were selected with the following in
mind: (i) could reasonably be considered likely to have
an impact on (perceptions of ) the peace process (ii)
received a reasonable amount of coverage in both the
Tamil and Sinhala publications (iii) reflect, or be likely
to influence a point of debate or controversy on a key
aspect of the peace process (say, power-sharing,
democracy, etc) and (iv) are spaced out through the
period 2002-2004. For each site, a brief outline of the
event is provided, along with some of the KAPS II
findings that make its consideration significant, before a
summary of the media perspectives on it is laid out. The
first four sites are: the military high security zones
(HSZs), the LTTE's withdrawal from Norwegian-
brokered negotiations in April 2003, the LTTE's
October 2003 proposals for an Interim Self-Governing
Authority (ISGA), and the participation of Tamil
residents in LTTE-held areas in the April 2004 elections.
In an attempt to examine possible intra-group (as
opposed to inter-group) dimensions of vernacular
reporting, this review also looks at coverage of President
Chandrika Kumaratunga's seizure of three ministries
from the United National Front (UNF) government in
November 2003; and the rebellion by the LTTE's
8 More material is available through Daily Resume archives for 2003 and 2004. Also material for the latter half of 2002 is presently not available to this study.
9 These include Daily Mirror, The Island, Daily News, among others.
Batticaloa-Amparai commander, Colonel Karuna, in
March-April 2004.10 There are, of course, several other
issues that fit the criteria above, but those selected here
are useful in demonstrating some of the key themes
identified in the vernacular press.
The Sinhala publications looked at primarily in the
review include Lankadeepa, Lakbima, Divaina, Ravaya,
and Lanka. Apart from the last, which is published by
the JVP, the others are independent. Divaina is the sister
of the ultra-nationalist, English language, The Island.
Circulation figures published by Foreign Broadcast
Information Service of the United States government
put Lankadeepa's at "approximately 100,000 daily and
200,000 on Sundays"; Lakbima's at "approximately
45,000 daily and 68,000 on Sundays," and Divaina's at
"approximately 20,000." By way of comparison, the
mostly (80 percent) state-owned Dinamina has a circulation
"of more than 30,000." Figures are not available for smaller
publications. The infrequently covered (and generally
smaller) papers like the Dinakara (the official publication of
the Sri Lanka Freedom Party) and others were looked at for
this review, but not given the same weight as those above.
Ravaya is a relatively small liberal-left newspaper, but it is
included here as one of Sri Lanka's leading anti-Sinhala
nationalist publications.11
The Tamil publications covered by the Daily Resume and
reviewed in this study are the Virakesari, Thinakkural,
Suderoli, and Thinamurusu. Apart from the latter, which
is published by the anti-LTTE Eelam People's
Democratic Party (EPDP), these are independent. The
Suderoli is the Colombo-based sister of the largest
circulating Jaffna daily, Uthayan, and their editorial lines
are close. Figures published by Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS) put Suderoli's circulation at
"approximately 25,000 daily and 28,000 for a weekly
edition"; and Thinakkural's at "approximately 23,000
daily and 35,000 for a weekly edition." Figures are not
available for others. By way of comparison, the state-
owned Thinakaran has an "approximate circulation of
15,000 daily and 22,000 on Sundays."
Whereas the KAPS II survey considered four ethnic
categories--Sinhala, Tamils, Tamils in Upcountry areas,
and Muslims--this media review takes a comparative and
contrasting look mainly at the two language categories.
Though there are Muslim newspapers (published in the
Tamil language), these are very few and have comparably
much smaller collective circulation. The leading
newspaper for the Muslim community is Navamani. The
paper is considered strongly supportive of the Sri Lanka
Muslim Congress (SLMC).12 This, and its lack of
coverage of significant developments (such as the efforts
by Muslim religious leaders, bypassing political leaders,
and regional LTTE officials to improve Tamil-Muslim
relations), lays open to question the extent to which it
reflects Muslim opinion. Nonetheless, the paper is
reportedly widely read among Muslims and thus
deserves qualified scrutiny.13 As such, while this study
looks mainly at the more diverse Sinhala and Tamil
media, Navamani's views on peace-related topics are
included--when available14--for a Muslim perspective.
Another newspaper is the Muslim Kural, which describes
itself as a "defender of Muslim interests," (RSF, 2004a
p.9) but is smaller, and is not covered by the Daily
Resume. At this point, there is an important aspect of the
Tamil language press that ought to be borne in mind
while considering their coverage and editorial policies:
they are all accessible to both the Tamil and Muslim
communities and are therefore likely to affect relations
between them, as well as perceptions of (and interactions
between) the SLMC and the LTTE.
11 |  Methodology
10 In fact, however, both topics demonstrated the reverse: a closing of ranks among newspapers in the same language category.
11 It is edited by Victor Ivan.
12 The Daily Resume characterizes it as such; and the paper editorial position tracks the SLMC's stances. It is not clear, however, how the splits with the SLMC
affects editorial policies.
13 Navamani was formed in 1996 by M. P. M. Azar who had previously worked with Tamils for 40 years. He argues, "It is the duty of Muslim journalists to
defend [our] rights" (RSF, 2004, p.9).
14 In some cases, for example during the Karuna rebellion, the Daily Resume did not include translations of Navamani's editorials.

As noted above, this study is situated in the general
political context outlined in the findings of the second
Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Survey (KAPS II) on
the Sri Lankan Peace Process, conducted by Social
Indicator (which is associated with the Centre for Policy
Alternatives, Colombo). As such, to prepare the ground
for outlining this study's findings, a summary of KAPS
II findings that are pertinent to the possible role of the
media is first provided. While KAPS II analyzed its
survey data from several perspectives, including ones
"beyond ethnicity," this study, in keeping with the
vernacular focus, takes note of the ethnicity-based trends
as its context (although intra-group perceptions are also
looked at). The rationale for this is, as succinctly pointed
out in KAPS II:
"Ethnic cleavages in Sri Lanka are palpable and permeate
virtually all aspects of politics, the economy, and society.
It is hardly surprising then that they play a major role in
shaping attitudes toward peace. [Furthermore],
consistent with this perspective, large differences exist in
the KAPS II among Sri Lanka's principal ethnic groups
with respect both to the number and types of peace
proposals that citizens are willing to accept for the sake
of achieving a permanent peace. While there are
differences in this regard between the Muslim and Tamil
minorities in Sri Lanka, the sharpest divisions are
between the Sinhala majority and everyone else" (Social
Indicator, 2004, p.20, emphasis added ).
This media study thus sets out to examine whether the
vernacular press coverage reflects KAPS II's findings on
prevailing attitudes in Sri Lanka's communities; and if
so, how closely? With the courtesy of Social Indicator
and Centre for Policy Alternatives, extracts of the
survey's findings are reproduced below, by way of a
preface. These include a summary of the survey's general
trends and some of the differences between the Sri
Lankan communities' sentiments.
GENERAL TRENDS
KAPS II found that Sri Lankan opinion regarding the
peace process has "intensified" over the past year. While
the public overall "became more supportive of a number
of specific peace proposals" in comparison to the 2003
survey, it also appears "to be more willing to resort to
protest if the peace agreement arrived at is perceived to
be unfair" (Ibid, p17). Indeed, as a measure, "protest
potential is substantially higher in 2004 than in 2003
with more than 60% of citizens, today, expressing a
willingness to protest an unfair agreement, and about
40% approving the use of violence if necessary to do so"
(Ibid, p.4, emphasis added). The concern therefore "is
not only whether they will revert to armed conflict
should negotiations fail, but also whether they will
protest against an unfair agreement or vote against
political parties perceived as either having obstructed the
peace process or as supporting an unjust agreement"
(Ibid, p.16, emphasis added). In particular, "Sri Lankans
express a remarkably strong and widespread willingness
to resort to protest and to punish parties for their role in
a failed or unjust peace accord, indicating perhaps the
intensity of feeling the peace process generates among
the country's citizenry" (Idem)-a point which must color
consideration of the defeat of the pro-peace UNF by the
UPFA in the April 2004 elections.16 It should be noted
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15 On the basis "none of Sri Lanka's ethnic groups are monoliths," the KAPS II study sought "to go beyond ethnicity to consider nuances within and across
ethnicities" (Social Indicator, 2004, p.26)
16 "For example, nearly 70% of citizens agree or strongly agree that they would join with others to protest against a peace agreement that they think is unfair,
compared to only 21% who clearly say that they would not do so. Four out of five citizens also say that they are prepared to vote against any political party
that supports an unfair agreement while only 11%  say they would not. Another nearly three quarters of respondents say they would vote against any
political party that was a 'spoiler' perceived to be responsible for obstructing a peace agreement."
that the UPFA--formed in the wake of President
Kumaratunga's seizure in November 2003 of three key
ministries from the UNF cabinet on the basis that the
UNF had undermined "national security" while
pursuing the peace process--made this issue the central
plank of its narrowly successful election campaign.
KAPS II categorizes respondents into four types in
relation to the peace process: Activist Supporters, Passive
Supporters, Passive Opponents, and Active Opponents,
noting: "the number of Activist Supporters has
substantially increased over the past year, as has the
number of Activist Opponents, although by a smaller
percentage. Passive Supporters and Passive Opponents
have both declined over the year indicating that the
peace process has become more politically charged
during this time period" (Ibid, p. 5, emphasis added).
Perhaps understandably, the survey found "those with
the greatest knowledge of the Peace Process are the most
likely to support the widest range of peace proposals."
But it found they are also "more likely to protest against
a peace proposal that is unfair or against a political party
that is perceived as a peace process spoiler" (Ibid, p.6).
Also, perhaps understandably, "those who have suffered
most in the war, are more likely to support a majority of
the peace proposals and also are much more willing to
protest an unjust or spoiled peace agreement" (Ibid,
p.39). Interestingly, particularly from the purposes of
this media review, "perhaps because the blame [for the
war] is widely spread, perceptions of the cause of the war
have relatively modest effects on attitudes toward the
peace process" (Ibid, p.39, emphasis added).
"ETHNICITY-CORRELATED" TRENDS
The survey found Sinhala ethnic group members are
"relatively equally divided" among the four peace types
and "are far from being the monolithic opponents of a
compromise peace as is sometimes portrayed." However,
the other ethnic groups "are dominated by Activist
Supporters of the peace process" (Ibid, p.5). Indeed,
Muslim and Tamils' "broad support for the peace process,
combined with their relatively high levels of protest
potential, means that members of these minority groups
are much more likely overall to be peace process activists
than members of the Sinhala community" (Ibid, p.23). 
In an effort to explore attitudes more deeply, KAPS II
presented respondents with several peace-related options
perceived as favored by some communities and opposed
by others, with the objective of gauging support for
compromise peace agreements. There was widespread
support for comprehensive reform of the Sri Lankan
constitution (over 80 percent across all communities)
and an impartial commission to monitor and enforce
human rights (over 93 percent in all communities) (Ibid,
p.21). But the survey found "Sinhalese respondents
overwhelming reject three of the proposals most favored
by the ethnic minorities, especially the Tamils: nearly
three-quarters of Sinhalese respondents absolutely reject
the LTTE idea of eliminating HSZs, and a similar
number reject both the LTTE demand for an ISGA and
the desire of some Muslims for a separate self-governing
region" (Ibid, p.21, emphasis added). By contrast,
"Tamils overwhelmingly support demands for an ISGA
(94%), the dismantling of HSZs (95%), and the
permanent merger of the Northern and Eastern
provinces (96%)" (Ibid, p.22).
This polarization is reflected in other peace-process
related trends. Support for a compromise peace
agreement "is strongest in the Northern and Eastern
Provinces and, to a lesser extent, in the Central
province." Opposition to a compromise peace agreement
"is strongest in the North Central Province followed by
the three southern provinces… Although even in these
most hostile areas there are large minorities willing to
accept a variety of proposals for peace" (Ibid, p.5). This
is possibly because, as the survey found, "the more
directly Sri Lankans have experienced the conflict, first
or second hand, the more likely they are to support a
compromise peace agreement. They also express much
higher peace protest potential." With the conflict having
been confined mainly to the North-East17 and Colombo,
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17 The use of North-East throughout this report recognizes the contested nature of the term. "Northeast" or "North and East" would denote different political
approaches to the aspirations of Tamil nationalism.
there are significant implications: "while virtually all
Tamils and Muslims have suffered directly as a
consequence of the war, a sizable minority of Sinhalese,
especially those in the southern provinces, have little or
no direct experience with the conflict and as a result are
much less supportive of a compromise peace agreement"
(Ibid, p.6). Most crucially, this has serious implications
when it comes to power-sharing, widely considered the
core of a permanent political solution. The survey found
in five areas of potential power-sharing (namely, military
and defense, foreign policy, police, judiciary, and
economics and taxation), "opinions were…clearly
polarized, with Tamils favoring more of a regional role
and Sinhalese and Muslims favoring greater centralized
power" (Ibid, p.7). Muslim apprehension of Tamil
domination is clearly visible. This, however, was
probably before Muslim political leaders decided to
unite behind a call for separate Muslim administrative
areas. The survey suggests Tamil opinion does allow for
the national government "to play at least an equal role in
these areas, suggesting that a compromise solution even
in these difficult areas may be possible" (Ibid).
The survey found that "Tamil and Muslim respondents
have somewhat slipped in their commitment to the
peace process over [2003-4]" and notes both groups
"have seen larger reductions in passive supporters of
peace" (Ibid, p.24). The defeat of the UNF by the
UPFA may not be unrelated to this, as, given its pro-
peace stance, it is said to have drawn substantial
minority support in 2001. Subsequently, as the survey
observes, "given the defeat of the previous government,
the failure of the peace process to make substantial
progress since the election, and the rise in ethnic
violence, it is not surprising that [minority] attitudes
toward peace have changed." In short, for Tamils and
Muslims, "the events of [2003-4] have led some of them
at least to question the value of the peace process and
others to become significantly more activist" (Ibid,
p.24). The survey's authors were surprised to find in the
same period, evidence of "a substantial decline in
opposition to the peace process among Sinhala
respondents and a proportionate increase in peace
process supporters" (Ibid, p.23). The survey's authors
admitted: "it is hard to determine whether the increased
support for the peace process among the Sinhalese
reflects a greater confidence in the new [UPFA]
government's handling of the peace process, or is a
manifestation of their fears of a process in jeopardy"
(Ibid, p.24). However, the election result must be
considered in the context of the almost diametrically
opposed positions the UNF and UPFA took on the
peace process in the campaigns.
Noting the need for trust in government to make a
peace agreement last, KAPS II found that "overall,
confidence in government institutions in Sri Lanka is
generally high. More than three quarters of citizens say
that they have a lot of trust or some trust in the army.
This is closely followed by the President who is trusted
by 71% of the country's citizens." But perhaps tellingly,
the survey also found "trust for the President and army
is much higher among Sinhalese respondents and lower
among minority ethnic groups." By contrast, the survey
found trust for [other] government institutions, such as
parliament and the police, "does not vary greatly across
ethnic cleavages" (Ibid, p.37). Crucially, moreover, "trust
in the President however, is strongly associated with
opposition to the peace proposals" (Ibid, p.37).  
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An examination of Sri Lanka's vernacular press revealed
a general, multi-faceted, and gradually deepening
Sinhala-Tamil divide, particularly on issues related to the
peace process--despite common ground on some issues
(like crime and corruption). It also revealed Muslim-
Tamil and, to a much lesser but tangible extent,
Muslim-Sinhala antagonisms.
To begin with, outside the peace process and other
"national" issues, there is (perhaps not unreasonably,
given their respective audiences) a focus on events in the
South in Sinhala publications, the North-East in Tamil
publications and on Muslim affairs in the Navamani.
But beyond this, there are important distinctions in the
topics of interest and concern. The Tamil press for
example, often covers matters like localized hardships
faced by internally displaced Tamil people, difficulties
faced by Tamils due to security measures in Colombo
and elsewhere, Navy attacks on Tamil fishermen, and so
on. These are rarely covered in the Sinhala language
press and if so, not with the same emphasis. However,
especially when Muslims were affected, these issues were
also raised by Navamani.18 The paper, moreover,
concentrates on difficulties faced by the Muslim
community in the East, particularly with the LTTE. The
Sinhala press regularly focuses on difficulties faced by
Sinhalese (businessmen, villagers, etc.) due to LTTE
activities; LTTE attacks on other Tamil groups (such as
the EPDP);19 expansions of LTTE police stations and
courts in government-held areas;20 smuggling of "LTTE"
contraband;21 etc.22 The Sinhala press regularly and
prominently carries reports on such issues as LTTE
rearmament and training, recruitment (particularly
under-age), and taxation/extortion.23 These issues are
covered much less in the Tamil press, except by the
Thinamurusu.24 Instead, Tamil publications might focus
on expansions of Sri Lankan military positions in Tamil
areas, problems faced by Tamils due to Sinhala language
dominance in state machinery, trials of security forces
members accused of rights violations against Tamil
civilians, and so on. While Tamil publications might
report on Tamils detained by the military, the Sinhala
media focus instead on security forces personnel or
Sinhala villagers held by the LTTE. The killings of Sri
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18 "Navy is continuously harassing the fishermen in the East by plundering their catch and attacking them unnecessarily," from editorial titled, "Fishermen must
be saved from the Navy," January 12, 2003. An editorial on October 19, 2003 also condemned strikes and rising cost-of-living; and defended trade unions
against government criticism.
19 While such attacks on other Tamil groups were sometimes covered, they usually did not elicit high-profile coverage or critical editorial comment in Tamil
papers, and less so if the victims were associated with anti-LTTE paramilitary activities.
20 These were also occasionally covered in Tamil press. Crucially, however, Sinhala media saw such actions as violations of the February 2002 ceasefire, but
the Tamil media did not. Reports of the post- ceasefire opening of LTTE military camps in government-controlled areas were seen as violations however, by
both, though Tamil papers were not directly critical, while Sinhala papers were strongly so.
21 Reports of interceptions of material often took lead story prominence, including items varying from uniforms and propaganda material to aircraft parts and
other equipment.
22 These topics are frequently covered on the front page and draw editorial comment.
23 In an unusual editorial the Divaina once explained to its readers: "We feel that everything we write in this column is almost always on the LTTE, which has
become a headache not only to you, but to all. … Every morning we hope that we would have an opportunity to write about something else, but
unfortunately we learn of a fresh atrocity committed by the Tigers." Divaina editorial, February 18, 2003.
24 These issues are sometimes covered obliquely in the Tamil press. For example, LTTE returns of underage recruits and interactions with UNICEF in this regard
are occasionally covered. Suderoli "208 child soldiers handed over to UNICEF," April 20, 2004.
Lankan military intelligence officers and Tamil
paramilitaries received high-profile coverage in the Sinhala
press (and was often cited as evidence of the LTTE's lack
of commitment to peace)25 and in Navamani, but received
less prominence in the Tamil press (again, with the
exception of Thinamurusu).26 Conversely, army plans to
establish a new base in Jaffna town, for example, drew
considerable and anxious Tamil press focus but much less
in Sinhala papers. On the issue of resettling internally
displaced people in the North-East, the Tamil press
generally treated them as a single category, but the Sinhala
media focused especially on the plight of Sinhalese
displaced.27 Likewise, on other issues like the shortage of
teachers, Tamil papers focused on the difficulties in the
North-East, rather than the country as a whole.28
LIMITED COMMONALITY
There are certainly areas of national interest and concern
that drew similar attention and criticism from all papers.
The rising cost of living, economic problems (including
unemployment and industrial strikes), corruption,
organized crime, violence in party politics, and so on, drew
sometimes comparable comments in Tamil, Sinhala, and
Muslim publications; as did increasing levels of violent
crime (often attributed to deserters from the military).
However, these issues did not receive as much emphasis
and prominence in the Tamil press as they did in the
Sinhala press. Perhaps because of a sense of Muslim
commercial interests being particularly vulnerable, the
issue of violent crime was raised more pointedly in the
Navamani (bracketing LTTE extortion and robberies by
deserters).
What is interesting is that immediately after the ceasefire,
all newspapers, including Sinhala media, were supportive
of the truce and peace process and it was in the course of
time that hostility to it emerged. Although political
opponents of the peace process, led by the JVP, began
agitating from the outset, perhaps the sentiments of the
Divaina-"this peace process is not mature enough to be
attacked or condemned yet"-held.29 Yet agreement on the
need for talks did not translate into a preparedness to
accommodate others' aspirations. Most importantly, from
the perspective of the peace process, the areas of cross-
ethnic commonality were not only limited, they did not
translate into a sense of national unity in engaging with
them. Among the Tamil papers, though on occasion there
were pluralist arguments,30 there was strong support for
northeastern autonomy based on a distinct Tamil identity.31
Similarly, while it also occasionally voiced a pluralist
argument,32 the Navamani more often asserted a distinct
Muslim identity and later came to argue in an editorial that
"Muslims need a separate [territorial] unit in the East. Only
this will satisfy the aspirations of the Muslims."33
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25 Divaina editorial 28 April, 2003; Lakbima editorial, April 29, 2003.
26 The front page coverage in most Tamil, Sinhala, and English papers (on 24 June 2003) of the high-profile assassination of the Terrorist Investigations
Division's Dehiwala chief, Sunil Thabrew, was one of the notable exceptions.
27 Lankadeepa, April 22, 2003, p.1 story: "No World Bank rehabilitation aid for border villages"; Divaina April 29, 2003, p.1 story: "No information about
displaced Sinhala families [in UNHCR survey]."
28 "The step motherly attitude of the government in this regard is making the people of the Northeast think that only a self-administration authority established
in the area would solve the problem." Suderoli editorial May 17, 2004.
29 Divaina editorial, February 25, 2002.
30 Thinakkural, for example, argued "we must turn the country into a multilingual, multi-religious pluralistic state." Editorial, January 2, 2004. Virakesari argued
"a democratic government should create an environment for the various communities to live in amity and dignity." Editorial 7 May 2004.
31 See Site 3 (ISGA) below.
32 "[The government] must protect all the Sri Lankans whether they are Sinhalese, Tamils Muslims or chauvinists." Navamani editorial,May 1, 2003. "If equality
to the Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims and Christian people is confirmed by law, ethnic problem will be over in this country." Navamani editorial, June 22, 2003.
33 Navamani editorial, September 7, 2003.
Sinhala papers focused more than the Tamil press on
inter-Sinhala party political violence (particularly by
ruling politicians). Meanwhile, both Tamil and Sinhala
(and to a much lesser extent, Muslim) papers gave
coverage to political infighting among Tamil politicians,
particularly the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF).
But while the Sinhala media covered it from the
viewpoint of LTTE supporters seeking control of the
party, the Tamil papers avoided this fault line. Moreover,
perhaps amid rising popular support for the pro-LTTE
Tamil National Alliance (TNA)--the joining of which
was a central dispute within the TULF--over time,
Sinhala papers backed the anti-LTTE faction and the
Tamil papers the other. The Navamani remained on the
sidelines, conscious, perhaps, of the ongoing serious split
within the SLMC.
ETHNIC DIVISIONS
More importantly for this study, when major issues of
controversy related to the peace process were reported on,
there was a general Sinhala-Tamil, even a Sinhala versus
Tamil, divide.34 There was also a Muslim versus Tamil
and, to a lesser extent, Muslim versus Sinhala divide on
some peace-related issues. The issue of high security
zones, for example, is covered by the Tamil press as a
resettlement problem (i.e. the dispersed military presence
preventing large numbers of Tamils from going home)
and by the Sinhala press as a security problem (i.e. the
LTTE attempting to weaken the military by seeking
dismantlement of the latter's defensive positions).35
The communal polarization is underlined most strongly
in the papers' occasional characterization of the island's
communities: there is a clear "essentializing of
ethnicity"36 -where Sinhalese, Tamils, or Muslims are
spoken of sas monolithic wholes. Criticizing LTTE
actions it considered inimical to peace, an editorial in
Divaina, for example, argued, "we are extremely patient
and stomaching quite a lot. But this is only because of
peace and not because of anything else. Though many
have forgotten, we have a proud history of many
thousands of years, 2,500 of it fed and nourished by the
philosophy of Buddhism."37 Conversely, Suderoli said,
"the religious fervor of the Sinhala Buddhists has up to
now vehemently gone against the granting of rights to
the people of the minority community" (Editorial,
August 7, 2003). Thinakkural protested, "it is the aim of
the Sinhala majority to ensure that Sinhala Buddhism is
supreme."38 Even the more moderate Virakesari
observed: "The history of the struggle of the Tamil
people is that it didn't begin with an armed struggle.39
The reality is that it has evolved through stages of
making appeals and demands performing Sathyagraha
[and] gradually manifested into an armed struggle"  and
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34 By way of an example, coverage of the LTTE-backed "Pongu Thamil" event held in Vavuniya on September 24, 2003, demonstrates the extent to which
polarization can sometimes occur. On September 25, Lakbima's story (fourth on front page), "Pongu Thamil unsuccessful," and Divaina's (front page) report
"Pongu Thamil a failure," which both claimed poor attendance, contrasted with Thinakkural's (main front page) story, 'Thousands attend Pongu Thamil' and
Virakesari's (main front page) report, which lead with the contents of the rally's declaration. The day before, both these Tamil papers (and Suderoli) carried
front page stories saying the event was underway in the decorated town on a large scale, while the Lakbima (the only Sinhala paper to report) lead with
"Tigers request not to obstruct Eelam flag." On September 26, Lakbima reported (third story on p.4) that participants had been forced to attend and
Dinamina's (p.3) story headlined with a "committee for peace" condemning the event as a violation of the ceasefire. By contrast, Virakesari's (second page
lead) story that day announced the next event would be in Mannar and its editorial praised "Pongu Thamil" as "the best way to show the Tamils' desire in
a peaceful manner."
35 See Site 1 below.
36 A phrase coined by Ronald J. Herring, which he argues resulted in,"Tamils and Sinhalese becoming dangerous shorthand devices for [what were] politically
complex communities." See Herring, Ronald (2001) "Making Ethnic Conflict: the civil war in Sri Lanka" in Esman, Milton J. and Herring, Ronald J. (eds)
Carrots, Sticks and Ethnic Conflict (University of Michigan, Ann Arbour).
37 Divaina editorial, February 10, 2003.
38 Thinakkural editorial, March 3, 2004.
39 Virakesari editorial, June 10, 2003.
"the root cause of the [national] problem is the
suppression of the minorities."40 The Navamani
observed, "the majority community gave precedence to
communal and religious feelings and did not give
consideration the welfare of the country. The Tamil
militants after acquiring armed power [considered] the
Muslims as a [separate] minority and treated them
harshly. With this the conflict became three [sided]."41
The "essentializing of ethnicity" inherent in this view
was often reflected in the paper's contents. Notably, its
editorials often starkly projected a Muslim-Tamil
acrimony and, occasionally, tensions with the Sinhalese,
with language such as "the Tamil [community] has failed
to secure the confidence of the Muslims."42
COVERING THE MUSLIMS
Amid the ethnic cleavages as identified in the KAPS II
survey, coverage of Muslim issues through Sinhala and
Tamil press is, perhaps inevitably, subordinated to
respective interests. Sinhala newspapers, for example,
focus mainly on Tamil-Muslim (in particular LTTE-
Muslim) tensions. The Tamil media also does so, but
from a different angle. While the Sinhala media place
more emphasis on reports of LTTE aggression toward
Muslims,43 Tamil press focus much more on LTTE
efforts to build or improve LTTE-Muslim and Tamil-
Muslim relations.44 Thus Sinhala papers do not cover
news of improving LTTE-Muslim relations, while
Tamil papers shy away from implicating the LTTE in
anti-Muslim acts. These differences are particularly
visible in reporting of communal clashes in the Eastern
districts.
The background to Tamil and Sinhala press coverage
since 2002 has undoubtedly been the wider debate on
northeastern autonomy/federalism and on an interim
administration (and in particular the LTTE's ISGA).
As such, while Sinhala papers often give publicity to
SLMC opposition to a permanent merger of the
North-East, there is less emphasis on and sympathy for
Muslim demands for self-rule in areas where they
constitute a majority. Tamil papers play down "de-
merger" calls as well as Muslim self-rule calls, and
instead call for "Tamil-speaking" unity. Both Sinhala
and Tamil papers acknowledge the distinct Muslim
identity, but the former does so in challenging the
Tamil-Sinhala divide and the latter in reinforcing it.
Both sets of papers gave regular and unsympathetic
coverage to infighting among the Muslim political
leadership, particularly the SLMC. 
As an aside, coverage of the Estate/Upcountry Tamils
was quite limited with respect to the peace process,
reflecting the lower profile of Estate political parties in
the peace process. Communal violence against Estate
Tamils received a fair amount of coverage. Tamil papers
did cover expressions of support for the LTTE/Tamil
struggle from Estate politicians, especially the
Upcountry People's Front (UPF). Generally, Estate
politics were covered in the context of the main party,
the Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC), joining or
leaving one ruling coalition or other and the related
implications for the stability of the government, along
with associated coverage of competition over ministries,
etc.
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40 Ibid, editorial, January 6, 2004.
41 Navamani editorial, November 14, 2003.
42 See for example: "The Tamil [community] has failed to secure the confidence of the Muslims" (Navamani, "Noise of Muslim armed group for 17 years,"
August 31, 2003); and "The discriminative stance of the Sinhalese has been the cause for the formation of the SLMC" (Navamani editorial, August 3, 2003).
43 Including the unquestioned implication of the LTTE's hand in anti-Muslim communal violence, etc.
44 Such as meetings between LTTE officials and Muslim community and political leaders and agreements reached thereafter.
SPLIT ON THE LTTE
Sinhala papers' suspicion and hostility toward the LTTE
remained undiminished and deeply colored coverage and
analysis of the peace process.45 Tamil papers (except
Thinamurusu) generally did not question, and
sometimes defended, the LTTE's bona fides.46 In 2002,
Navamani accepted the LTTE's sincerity, but later, amid
wider disillusionment with the peace process, became
strongly critical, though not in the vein adopted by
Sinhala parties (LTTE getting ready for a new war).47
Crucially, as a general trend, while the Sinhala press
regularly categorizes the LTTE as "terrorist" and
"criminal;"48 the Tamil press, while not necessarily
lauding the LTTE, report from within a framework of
not questioning and, over time, explicitly accepting the
LTTE's claimed political legitimacy.49 For example, while
Sinhala media consistently covered LTTE taxation from
a perspective of extortion; by late 2003, Suderoli felt able
even to rationalize it on the basis of development of the
North-East economy.50 This is not to say that there
wasn't criticism of the LTTE (as we shall see below), but
it was usually on issues of peace-related significance.51
Even the exception to this, Thinamurusu (whose
condemnation of the LTTE is as strong as in some
Sinhala papers) is measured in its criticism of LTTE
stances on political issues of importance to the Tamil
audience, and is even supportive of some (for example
on the merger of the North-East).52 Notably, there was
(after 2002) a sense of Tamil political goals being
pursued within united Sri Lanka, with regular references
to the LTTE's acceptance (as the Tamil papers saw it) of
a federal solution to the conflict. 
In general, compared against negotiating positions
adopted by the LTTE and the government at the six
rounds of talks, the Tamil press broadly (and, in some
cases, precisely) echoed LTTE positions while the
Sinhala press broadly reflected the government's (and,
more precisely, the military's) stances on issues of
contention. However, amid an overarching concern with
peace, Tamil papers censured the LTTE for actions seen
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45 Lankadeepa's editorial argued on September 1, 2003, for example: "So far there is lot of evidence to prove the Tiger organization has not given up its terrible
past." Lakbima argued in its editorial of April 20, 2003: "All the information we are getting is more than sufficient to prove that the LTTE has not given up
terrorism in any way and we pointed this out from the very first day the [ceasefire] was signed." Divaina observed in its September 12, 2003 editorial: "While
there is no major difference in statements and the deeds of the government it is completely opposite when you take into account the LTTE. All what you
see is contradiction." Lanka editorial (May 31, 2004) said: "The history of the LTTE clearly indicates that breaking pledges is nothing new to them."
46 Thinakkural editorial, September 5, 2003: "Tigers have stopped their armed struggle and come forward to seek a solution through a political process";
Suderoli editorial (August 20, 2003): "It is a fact that the LTTE has left the armed struggle aside, at least temporarily."
47 An op-ed in the Navamani (February 15, 2002) even defended the LTTE's recruitment, arguing "both sides have to be in readiness to face any situation. It is
why the security forces are also recruiting to their cadre." "What to talk if LTTE gives up Tamil Eelam and weapons?"
48 For example, Divaina's editorial (March 27, 2003) declared: "LTTE is a terrorist organization that did so many hideous things in Sri Lanka." The Lankadeepa
editorial (March 21, 2003) points out "terrorism in the north had a devastating effect in the south. We also must not forget the border villages in the Tiger's
mouth." The left-wing, anti-Sinhala nationalist Ravaya (April 27, 2003) concedes, "LTTE is not an honest political organization."
49 Ahead of LTTE leader Vellupillai Pirapaharan's 'Heroes Day' speech, Thinakkural's editorial (November 27, 2003) asserted: "The address by the Tiger leader
on the National Heroes day will reflect the aspirations of the Tamil people." Suderoli's editorial (September 23, 2003) noted: "The Tigers, sole representative
of Tamils, refuse to lay down their arms, the only power they possess, till they receive a reasonable political settlement." Even the more cautious Virakesari
steadily shifted its position: On May 24, 2003 it described the LTTE as "fighting for self-determination in a part of the country" and its editorial of June 10,
2003 noted, "the Tamil struggle has evolved through the stages of making appeals and demands performing Sathyagraha, which gradually manifested in to
an armed struggle." By December 9, 2003, Virakesari was asserting "Tigers are the sole representatives of the Tamil people" and, on January 6, 2004, "the
Tigers have shed blood in the last two decades for the rights and aspirations of the Tamils."
50 Suderoli editorial (December 17, 2003) stated: "[Tax] changes with the development of the economy in mind."
51 For example, amid reports that a national athletic event to be held in the Alfred Duraiappa stadium in Jaffna was called off under LTTE pressure, Lankadeepa
and Divaina carried strongly worded editorials (September 17, 2003), but the issue was hardly taken up in the Tamil press.
as undermining the peace process53 and there were key
instances of departure. For example in contrast to the
LTTE's position, Virakesari urged the involvement of a
separate Muslim delegation at the talks.54 (Virakesari
later abandoned the idea and, like the Thinakkural--
which was also mildly supportive of a separate Muslim
delegation--was more concerned that the issue should
not preclude the resumption of LTTE-government
talks).55 Thinakkural criticized the LTTE for not
attending the Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and
Development of Sri Lanka in June 2003. Suderoli took a
strong pro-LTTE position on most issues salient to the
peace process (including, for example, resettlement of
displaced people before talks on core issues are held, de-
proscription of the LTTE and so on). Other Tamil
papers adopted somewhat more measured approaches.56
Since February 2002, the Navamani has increasingly
taken a critical, even hostile, position on the LTTE;57
although earlier in 2002, particularly in the wake of the
SLMC-LTTE agreement, the paper was conciliatory.58
Yet, while blaming and condemning the LTTE for
harassment of Muslims, the paper accepted the LTTE as
"the Tamils' liberation army;"59 and argued that when
"[the country's] rulers tried to suppress [the minorities]
at gunpoint…Tamil youths of both sexes took up arms
and fought against oppression."60 Its position, in essence,
is that the LTTE is correctly fighting against oppression
of the Tamils by the state, but is in turn oppressing the
Muslims (whom, moreover, the Tamils are also hostile
to). The paper often appealed to the Sri Lankan
government to protect Muslims from the LTTE and was
outraged at what is saw as the UNF's accepting LTTE
claims of control.61 Indeed, Navamani oscillated between
characterizing Muslims as Tamil-speaking residents of
the North-East and, more often, aligning them with
Sinhalese as common victims of the LTTE.62 The
Navamani was strongly critical of LTTE attacks on Sri
Lankan military intelligence officers and informants,
which were generally located in the context of attacks on
Muslims that the paper blamed on Tamils or LTTE
cadres.63 Notably, the paper gave almost no coverage of
efforts by Muslim religious community and LTTE
leaders to improve communal relations. The paper on
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53 Thinakkural for example, even covered on its May 2, 2003 front page a call by the (anti-LTTE) TELO for "all Tamil people to rally against the LTTE for
withdrawing from talks." There was also editorial concern over the LTTE's provocative demand for a sea corridor for its gunboats and the de-stabilizing
controversy that erupted over LTTE camps said to have been erected in government territory after the ceasefire was signed.
54 Virakesari editorial (September 30, 2003) wrote: "The cry for an independent Muslim delegation [at the talks], a share for Muslims in the interim
administration and security [for] Muslims are the reflection of sufferings they have undergone in 1990." The editorial, titled 'Dialogue with the Muslim
community' welcomed talks between LTTE and Muslim community leaders. See also Virakesari editorial of October 23, 2003.
55 Virakesari editorial (May 10, 2004): "It is imperative that the two main parties to the conflict must talk" (emphasis added). 
56 Thinakkural, for example, (when during the Berlin round of talks, three LTTE cadres blew up their trawler after it was intercepted by the navy), criticized the
LTTE's arms smuggling efforts as casting doubts on its bona fides and also undermining the UNF vis-à-vis its nationalistic PA/JVP opposition. (Editorial,
February 11, 2003).
57 See Navamani editorial (September 7, 2003): "Muslims have been affected and not benefited by the LTTE in any way."
58 See Navamani editorial (February 22, 2002) titled "LTTE must forget the past." 
59 See, for example, Navamani editorial (November 14, 2003).
60 Navamani editorial, March 23, 2003.
61 "The govt. is unable to protect these Muslims who are loyal to the govt. The legal govt. itself is telling the Muslims to ask the armed ones if they want their
rights and protection. If so, have the North and East been de-merged [from the rest of the country]?" Navamani editorial, August 24, 2003
62 See, for example, Navamani editorial 5 April 2003 in which it was written: "Muslims also have been speaking Tamil Language and they are living in the
north and east (emphasis added). Also Navamani editorial, June 15, 2003: "[The LTTE's actions] caused fear and insecurity in the minds of the Sinhala and
Muslim people."
63 See Navamani editorials "Country proceeding towards danger" (May 1, 2003) and "Warning activities not good for the country" (June 22, 2003).
occasion gave prominent coverage to alarmist claims of
impending LTTE violence.64
Tamil media often came out, sometimes forcefully,
against state discrimination against Tamils, which
Sinhala media rarely did.65 This aspect is particularly
interesting given the KAPS II finding that over 50
percent of Sinhala respondents cited either
"discrimination against Tamils, government policies
promoting Sinhala nationalism, or ethnic intolerance" as
the primary cause of the war (these are also the most
widely cited causes among Tamils and Muslims) (Social
Indicator, 2004, p.40). Despite its generally antagonistic
approach to the Tamils and the LTTE, Navamani
editorials have also argued that "the rejection of the just
demands of the Tamils met with armed aggression and
precipitated the ethnic confrontation"66 and that "the
problem that cropped up between the races [should
have] been settled by democratic process."67
POLITICAL PARTIES
Most Tamil papers strongly backed demands for Tamil
political rights and few openly sided with typical
Sinhala positions on these.68 In general, however, these
positions adopted by the Tamil press were in line with
those of the pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance (TNA),
which also did well at the April 2004 general elections.
Thus while the TNA generally received supportive
Tamil media coverage (with the exception of
Thinamurusu), it was denounced in the Sinhala media
as "stooges" of the Tigers and its political legitimacy
was questioned.69 Tamil media generally did not
question the extent of popular support claimed by the
JVP and other anti-peace Sinhala parties. But the
frequent and strong criticism of SLFP/PA, JVP, JHU,
etc. as "Sinhala chauvinists" in the Tamil media70 is in
contrast with sympathy for these actors' positions on
the peace process in the Sinhala press. While less
consistently, the Navamani also characterized these
actors as chauvinists.71
The Tamil media's generally favorable coverage of the
UNF's peace efforts was often in contrast with negative
coverage in the Sinhala press.72 Tamil papers were
welcoming of the UNF government's preparedness to
negotiate with the LTTE and critical of President
Kumaratunga's resistance, as well as the PA and JVP's
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64 See the front-page story of December 14, 2003, "The Tigers are planning to attack the Muslims again after the GCE O/L exam ends!"
65 "Even after non-violent struggles and armed struggles in the last 50 years, not an iota of change have taken place in the minds of chauvinists. The minorities
have been treated as second-class citizens without any room for equality." Thinakkural editorial, February 19, 2003. "The [authorities] are harassing the Tamil
people under the pretext of going against the LTTE." Suderoli editorial, February 18, 2003 "After Independence, governments attempted to fulfill the
aspirations of the majority on the expense of the minority. The suppression has developed to an extent of destroying the entire organs of the minority. This
lead to ethnic killings." Virakesari editorial, August 19, 2003.
66 Navamani editorial, November 14, 2003.
67 Ibid, March 23, 2003.
68 The strident language of the Thinakkural editorial of January 13, 2003 is an example: "Liberation consciousness and [the goal of] self-determination …
cannot be put down by suppression. The Tamil race has been molded in the fire of Sinhalese ethnic suppression." The more moderate Virakesari argued
(November 4, 2003): "The major political parties in the country have not done anything significant [for] the minority community so far. They give empty
promises before the election and forget their commitments when they are installed in power." 
69 See Divaina editorial, March 8, 2004.
70 See Site 2 and Site 3 below.
71 See Navamani editorial, July 20, 2003, "The PA, MEP, JVP, SU, and other chauvinist organizations are against the Interim Administration." Earlier, the paper
argued: "JVP and SLFP are indulging in promoting racism and this has worried the minorities" (May 5, 2002).
72 Lanka claimed in a front-page story, for example, that the government was even planning to allow a "separate national flag and anthem for northeast"
(January 5, 2003).
hostility to the peace process.73 Criticism of Prime
Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's government rose after
the LTTE withdrew from the talks in April 2003. The
objections were along the lines of the LTTE's proffered
rationale for withdrawing,74 but most criticism (much of it
vehement) was directed at the SLFP/PA and JVP. While in
2002 Navamani was supportive of the UNF's peace
efforts,75 it grew increasingly critical in 2003 and before the
April 2004 polls was scathing. The protests were primarily,
as we shall see below, perceived to be about the reluctance
to accommodate a Muslim delegation at the talks and the
continuing insecurity for Muslims in the East.
With the exception of the Suderoli,76 criticism of President
Kumaratunga herself emerged gradually: initially Tamil
commentary was cautious, and instances where she stated
her support for the UNF's peace process drew overt praise.77
But later, amid escalating animosity and power struggles
with the premier, the comments became much harsher.78
After the UPFA came to power, the Tamil papers were
strongly critical of the cycle of violence in the Eastern
province, particularly amid LTTE accusations of
government backing for Tamil paramilitaries (including the
Karuna group).79 However, unlike the Sinhala papers whose
front pages were dominated by reports (some sensational
and inaccurate)80 on violence between the LTTE and the
Karuna group, Tamil front pages focused on the peace
process and diplomatic efforts to resume talks. Tamil papers
were suspicious of the UPFA's stated post-election readiness
to negotiate with the LTTE.81 Yet the UNF's refusal to
support the UPFA's peace moves was also criticized.82
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73 Thinakkural, for example, observed in an editorial on March 26, 2003: "The UNF and the LTTE are trying to find peace for the past one year in spite of various
controversies and contradictions but [the PA and JVP] dissect, twist and turn and reject everything in this regard and are busy rousing up racism for their
own vested interests." Suderoli observed in its editorial on July 12, 2003: "There were times when it was thought whether Ranil is also trying to hoodwink
as was done by his predecessors. Even those who thought so, have realized that the Prime Minister is not in a position to do anything on his own. His UNP
also does not have absolute majority in parliament." Even the anti-LTTE Thinamurusu argued, amid increasing political instability, in its editorial of October
2, 2003, that "The Tamil sector is worried that if [the President changes the government] or a fresh election is [called], the peace efforts being made by the
present government would be affected."
74 In other words, for not implementing agreements already reached, the failure of the Sub-Committees (SIHRN) etc. Furthermore, the UNF was sometimes
criticized for not doing more to counter the vehement anti-peace campaign waged by the opposition PA and JVP.
75 In the wake of the UNF's success in local govt. polls, the paper argued, "the victory for the UNF is an endorsement by the people for the UNF peace efforts"
(March 31, 2002).
76 "President Kumaratunga has been engaging terrorism against the Tamil people." Suderoli editorial, January 2, 2003: "Sri Lanka's President who gives only
lip service to peace, does everything possible to disrupt and foil it." Suderoli editorial, April 9, 2003: "[She] was deluded with a hunger for war and
chauvinistic ideals and took the country to the brink of an economic disaster during the six years." 
77 For example, Virakesari, while noting that discussions between the SLFP and JVP on uniting to defeat the pro-peace UNF was causing anxiety, found
President Kumaratunga's assurances talks would continue under a new government "delightful." Editorial April 2, 2003 though Suderoli, on the same
occasion, was more skeptical, questioning the practicalities of Kumaratunga's pledge: "Will the LTTE continue the peace talks with a government [including
the JVP,] a chauvinist party?"
78 Thinakkural observed in its editorial of September 12, 2003: "The JVP, the President, and the opposition parties are the biggest obstacles to the government
and have stymied [peace] efforts." Virakesari criticized President Kumaratunga for undermining peace efforts in its editorial of May 12, 2003; but then
reversed its position on July 31, 2003: "The President was in favor of peace from the beginning. She is not an obstacle for negotiations or for Interim
administration" Emboldened by international criticism of the President, Thinakkural launched a strong attack on June 11, 2003 and condemned her
"dictatorial" moves on October 28, 2003.
79 See Site 5 below.
80 Many Sinhala newspaper reports even exceeded the claims published in Neruppu, the electronic news bulletin of the Karuna group.
81 See, for example, Virakesari editorial, May 17, 2004: "The general feeling of the people is that the peace talks are being initiated only to receive foreign
aid"; also Suderoli, May 7, 2004: "Is this late realization of wisdom or something else?"; Thinakkural, May 11, 2004: "It is comforting to realize that Colombo
due to international pressure has no alternative but to ensure that the [peace process] is continued." 
82 "Every time when a government tries to bring about peace, [there are ] objections [by] the opposition. [This has] become the political culture of the majority
parties." Thinakkural editorial, May 14, 2004; "All political parties must realize that, it does not matter which political party is able to achieve peace, but
that country needs it desperately."
When the JVP began its campaign against renewed talks
with the LTTE and the ISGA (i.e., continuing its stated
policy before the elections), it drew particular
condemnation from the Tamil papers83 amid continuing
skepticism of President Kumaratunga's commitment to
peace.84
Apart from overall hostility to the LTTE, there was also
considerable criticism in the Sinhala language press of
the UNF government positions seen as inimical to
Sinhala interests.85 Sinhala publications (with exceptions
of liberal papers like the Ravaya) were regularly critical
and suspicious of the UNF government's negotiations
and its relationship with the LTTE, a factor fuelled by
allegations by the main opposition of "Elephant-Tiger"
collaboration and other actions inimical to Sinhala
interests.86 As such, until the change of government in
April 2004, the Sinhala press often reflected, and indeed
amplified, the criticism of the ceasefire, peace process,
and associated matters leveled by President Chandrika
Kumaratunga and her main opposition SLFP, as well as
the ultra-nationalist JVP. Conversely, there was
confidence in President Kumaratunga's ability to handle
the peace process.87 Amid concern that the peace process
(under "weak" Sri Lankan leadership) could potentially
undermine Sri Lanka's unitary status, the possibility that
international post-conflict financial assistance could be
forthcoming was welcomed.88 Yet there was also
unhappiness with the UPFA after it defeated the UNF
and then declared it was prepared to negotiate
(bilaterally) with the LTTE on an interim
administration.89 But with foreign aid remaining
conditional on progress in the peace process, a
Lankadeepa editorial, interestingly, criticized the UNF
for not supporting the UPFA's own peace efforts.90
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83 Virakesari editorial, May 19, 2004 asked: "How is the [UPFA] going to take the peace process forward [now]?" Thinakkural editorial, May 20, 2004 asked:
"How to handle the change of stance of the JVP?" Echoing suspicions voiced by the LTTE, the Suderoli editorial of May 20, 2004 warned the government
against following a twin-track strategy (appeasing Sinhala nationalist and international opinion). 
84 See Suderoli editorial, May 21, 2004.
85 After the UNF's defeat in April 2004, Divaina opinioned: "One of the main reasons that led to the defeat of Ranil Wickramasinghe's UNF government is they
accepted the LTTE as the sole representative of Tamil people while also allowing them to carry out an independent state of their own in the northeast."
(Editorial May 6, 2004).
86 Apart from editorials casting criticizing UNF's for being soft on the Tigers, Sinhala reports often allege collusion between the UNF and LTTE. For example,
Lakmina claimed on April 6, 2003: "[UNF minister] Jayalath Jayawardena has gifted 500 motorcycles to the LTTE bought at a cost of Rs. 56.1 million from
his ministry funds"; Divaina alleged in a lead story on April 20, 2003 that: "Rs. 200 million goes to Tigers every month from government relief funds." Lanka
claimed in a front-page story on May 4, 2003: "Prime Minister lying about not giving sea corridor for LTTE." The Tamil language Thinamurusu was not averse
to joining in, one political feature suggesting: "UNP, which lost 11 elections consecutively, finally succeeded with the help of the LTTE, after giving it many
assurances. Only these two sides know what they agreed upon." (Thinamurusu "LTTE adamant, government blinks," May 25, 2003).
87 Divaina observed in its editorial of May 30, 2003, that President Kumaratunga had now "changed her stance all of a sudden and expressed willingness to
talk to the LTTE…[But] we are confident that the Tigers will not be able to fool the President, but we also must not over look the uncanny ability the LTTE
has in misleading people…All previous governments were fooled by the LTTE and Rajiv Gandhi and President Premadasa are some who not only were fooled
by the LTTE, but were also torn to pieces."
88 For example, Lankadeepa's editorial, April 20, 2003 ("Let's make the most of the New Year's Gift") was supportive of the peace process and even of the
UNF's strategy: "What is important right now is to handle the peace process very carefully and intelligently with the help of the international community."
Even Divaina's usually caustic editorial column occasionally relented, as on September 1, 2003: "We must not forget that under the present Globalization
process, Sri Lanka will not be able to survive, unless it works in tandem with the international community in every aspect such as economically and
politically…The International Community has urged very clearly for both parties to resolve in to a peaceful solution, if we are to receive foreign aid in the
future. Everyone living in Sri Lanka must realize that other than dialogue, there is no other alternative to accomplish peace."
89 Divaina lamented "there is hardly any difference between the policies of the UNF and the UPFA on the LTTE" and warned of the UPFA "embracing the same
factors that brought about the humiliating defeat of the UNP" (Editorial, May 6, 2004). Lakbima urged patience, but also warned the UPFA not to repeat the
UNF's mistakes (Editorial,  May 12, 2004) Divaina criticized the JVP for not restraining the UPFA on its moves to negotiate with the LTTE (Editorial 12 May
2004).
90 Lankadeepa editorial, May 21, 2004.
COVERING THE INTERNATIONAL
The Sinhala press was welcoming of international
criticism of the LTTE, particularly from the United
States91 (though there are suspicions of U.S. motives,
too92).93 Sinhala papers sought Indian intervention
against the Tigers.94 Yet there were also anxieties that, via
the peace process, the LTTE was now able to court
international goodwill.95 On the other hand, the Sinhala
media was also sensitive to perceived infringements of Sri
Lanka's sovereignty.96 International backing for the peace
process (i.e. negotiations with the LTTE) in general, and
the Norwegian role (and international monitoring) in
particular, came under strong suspicion and criticism.97
For example, Divaina, which routinely takes an
uncompromisingly critical view on the LTTE and the
peace process, characterized UNF goodwill measures and
compromises at the table as surrenders to terrorism.
Notably, these hostile attitudes to the peace process in the
Sinhala press were very much in line with the central
themes of the successful 2004 election campaign of the
Sinhala nationalist parties, the JVP and the JHU.
Conversely, Tamil publications were invariably supportive
of the peace process and the Norwegian role.98 They were
also welcoming of international support for the peace
process.99 Some, like Suderoli, were also critical of U.S.
characterization of the LTTE as a terrorist organization.100
Interestingly, on the controversial issue of Indian
involvement, Virakesari and Thinakkural were positive,
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91 Lakbima editorial, April 20, 2003: "We have a lot of problems over the U.S. foreign policy, which are generally affecting all third world countries [yet we]
appreciate the U.S. stance on the LTTE." 
92 A day after the U.S. reiterated its support for the Norwegian peace process, for example, in an editorial titled 'Definite Suspicions,' a Divaina editorial,
March 31, 2003 questioned U.S. motives in the wake of mere (and inaccurate) reports that the U.S. was seeking direct talks with the LTTE. Amid general
criticism in the Sinhala press of U.S. war in Iraq, it noted that, "America is obsessed with toppling governments in other countries," and asked why the
United States was pandering to the Tigers.
93 Divaina, for example, in a March 27, 2003 editorial titled "God bless Putin" welcomed Russia's refusal of a purported approach by the LTTE for anti-aircraft
missiles. 
94 Lakbima, for example, hoped the "government would be able to secure Indian assistance to a devolution process that would not exceed the limits practiced
in India [and] have the foresight to seek the support of the Indian government to reject any devolution of powers being demanded by the LTTE." (Editorial,
October 15, 2003).
95 Divaina editorial, May 5, 2003: "Thanks to peace talks, the LTTE is permitted to travel the world, as they desire. … The Tigers have the uncanny ability to
fool the governments of countries they visit, an ability that seem to be non-existent among any diplomatic mission of the Sri Lankan government. … [The]
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, whose sole job seems to be protecting the LTTE." In its editorial on April 21, 2003, Divaina criticized the SLMM, "which sees
the LTTE as a bunch of harmless kittens."
96 Britain's calls for free and fair elections, for example, promoted a vitriolic attack by Divaina on the United Kingdom's "colonial mentality" - even as the
newspaper accepted that Sri Lankan polls were indeed not free and fair. (Editorial, March 1, 2004).
97 Lanka for example, refers to the "massive rejection of the Norwegians emerging from people in Sri Lanka" and argued that the United States was promoting
Japan's involvement as criticism would be forestalled as the latter "is also a Buddhist country" (Lead story, May 4, 2003). A front-page story in Divaina on
December 7, 2003 began: "The Norwegian government which helped more than six terrorist organizations all over the world, including the LTTE in Sri Lanka,
to carry out their activities unhampered, is now making arrangements to introduce an anti-terrorist act in Norway."
98 For example, Suderoli, slamming U.S. criticism of the LTTE after it withdrew from talks in April 2003, noted, "Norway is to some extent behaving without
discrimination" (Editorial, May 4, 2003).
99 International pressure on the Sri Lankan government was seen as necessary for the peace process to progress. For example, Thinakkural's editorial of June
15, 2004 argued: "it is only the pressure exerted by the International community and the carrot of aid by donor countries, which are making these [UPFA,
JVP] parties pay at least lip service to [peace] process." Suderoli's editorial on the same day argued: "[President Kumaratunga] intends to dupe the Tigers
and the international community [so as] to receive the [aid] pledges of Tokyo conference. The donor community should note and understand this conspiracy."
100 See for example Suderoli editorials from August 12, 2003 and October 7, 2003.
but the Suderoli, while not hostile, was suspicious.101 The
usually conservative Virakesari even criticized India's new
Congress government for extending the proscription of
the LTTE in 2004.102
Navamani generally did not comment on international
aspects of Sri Lanka's conflict, except on the rare
occasion when the paper saw the international
community as precluding war by acting as a restraint on
the LTTE103 or pressuring both sides to talk.104 However,
in its April 22, 2002 editorial it expressed concern at
international involvement in the region: "Sri Lanka must
not permit international forces to set foot in this
country displacing India. It must internationally follow
the non-aligned policy. Now is a crucial time for Sri
Lankan diplomacy." When it did express an opinion on
international politics, it was pointedly hostile to the
United States. In the wake of the war in Iraq, for
example, it lashed out at the United States--and the
UNF government as "stooges" of the U.S.--and warned
there were consequences to relying on Washington.105 In
early 2002, the paper was strongly critical of U.S.
support for Israel.106
MUSLIM ISSUES
While Sinhala and Tamil discourses have common, if
contradictory, issue areas, there are unique concerns in
the Muslim perspective. A frustration frequently voiced
by Navamani was a sense of Muslim exclusion from the
peace process, and the topic was the focus of several
editorials. The inclusion of SLMC leader (and ports
minister in the UNF government) Rauf Hakeem in the
Sri Lankan government delegation apparently did little
to alleviate this. On February 9, 2003, the paper
protested that "neither the government nor the LTTE is
keen to have Muslims as an independent [group] in the
talks." In the wider context of the SLMC and Hakeem
pushing repeatedly for a separate Muslim delegation at
the table--and both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan
government being less than enthusiastic about this--the
pro-SLMC Navamani's line is perhaps understandable.
But its argument is based on a claim that any solution to
the ethnic question must involve the participation of
Muslim representatives.107 The paper admitted, however,
that "on the matter of settling the ethnic problem
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101 Thinakkural's editorial of January 14, 2003: "It is felt that India's share and contribution [to the peace process] is an absolute necessity"; Virakesari said:
"We believe that a favourable relationship with neighbouring India is beneficial" (Editorial, August 23, 2003). The paper also urged India to "clasp the hands
of friendship extended by the Tigers," arguing that "Tigers are the sole representatives of the Tamil people and India has to patch up with them to ensure a
fair deal for the Tamil community" (Editorial, December  9, 2003). Suderoli argued, "India keeps on saying that it wants peace in Sri Lanka, but it is not doing
anything more than mere lip service" (Editorial, February 17, 2003 ). But on suggestions that India should participate in the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission,
Suderoli asked "Can we appoint a plaintiff as the judge?" noting that "India gives information to Sri Lanka Navy about LTTE's trade ships moving in the seas
and India insists on clashes between LTTE and Navy" (Editorial, April 29, 2003).
102 Virakesari even defended the LTTE against accusations in the Indian press the Tigers were inimical to Indian interests (Editorial, May 25, 2004).
103 "It is also not possible for the LTTE to do now what they did in 1995. Neither the govt. nor the LTTE can go for war now easily, because many countries of
the world have got involved in the peace program, and the entire process is being watched by the envoys of these countries," wrote the Navamani editorial
on April 17, 2003. 
104 "International community are adding severe pressure on the govt. as well as the LTTE to have talks and settle the issue. Even the people in this country want
peace and the war to end" (Navamani editorial,  January 15, 2002).
105 "Greater interest has been shown in recent times to serve the U.S.. Their U.S. stooging has brought insult to the country. [UNP] President Premadasa was
different. He dared. But what is the position of his disciples? Will the world have any respect to those who aid and abet injustice? A few are having hopes
that the U.S. will come to our rescue when we are in danger. If by any chance the U.S. does come, they will take over our land and aggress it directly or
indirectly" (Navamani editorial, October 19, 2003).
106 See for example, May 19, 2002, editorial: "The entire world knows that it is the USA and their stooge the Israelis who are terrorists, while they claim that
they want to wipe out terrorism." And March 24, 2002, editorial: "Any country which has the blessing of America can do any damage, aggression and
injustice and no one can question it."
107 "Muslims want equal opportunity in the peace talks" Navamani editorial, May 11, 2003.
Muslims don't have a clear view as to who should
represent them at the talks"108 and agitated that Tamils
and Sinhalese were taking advantage of increasing
Muslim disunity.109 By the same logic, it seemed to
accept the LTTE's claim to represent of the Tamils and,
crucially, saw the Sri Lankan government as representing
the Sinhalese.110
Tensions within the SLMC--which resulted in a serious
split in the party in early 2003--inevitably also colored
the Navamani's stances. As senior SLMC rebels
threatened to defect to the opposition, accusing Hakeem
of failing to pursue Muslim interests; the Navamani also
attacked the UNF leadership, accusing it of failing to
protect Muslims from the LTTE and Tamil communal
violence111 as well as denying the community a separate
delegation at the talks.112 Notably, suspicions of UNF-
LTTE collaboration in marginalizing the Muslims
seemed to grow in early 2004, shortly before the
elections in which the UNF was defeated.113 Notably,
while Hakeem allied with the UNF and other SLMC
candidates contested on other tickets, the Navamani
poured scorn on the peace process114 and after the UNF's
defeat, noted: "The politicians who came to power by
giving false promises were sidelined."115 Interestingly, at
the same time, apparently exasperated by Muslim
politicians' bickering, the Navamani urged the Muslim
community to unite behind religious leaders instead116
and, in one evocatively titled editorial, "Do we follow
the Satan because he is praying?" launched a strong
attack on corrupt and amoral (but unnamed)
politicians.117
Another issue frequently raised by the Navamani was the
alienation and radicalization of Muslim youth on the
basis of their exclusion from the politics and harassment
by the LTTE and Tamils. Amid the rebellion within the
SLMC against Hakeem, the paper accused Muslim
politicians of fostering disunity among youth and
pointedly lamented the passing of SLMC founder M.
Ashraff.118 The specter of extremist youth movements
was occasionally raised threateningly: "In fact, if the
Muslims will resort to arms the bloodbath will further
increase along with so many other problems. Therefore,
the government must be creative in taking the right
course of action. The security of Muslims must be
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108 See Navamani editorial, February 16, 2003, "Politicians who divert."
109 See for example, Navamani editorial, May 11, 2003: "There is no unity among the Eastern Muslims and this split is being made an advantage by the
government and the Tigers" 
110 Navamani editorial, February 16, 2003: "The majority community enjoys the security of the armed forces, while the Tamils have the liberation army, [but]
what of the Muslims?"
111 "In the east Muslims are being attacked, taxed and demanded ransom, while abduction and confiscation of properties are also taking place" Navamani
editorial, May 1, 2003.
112 "Security is not provided by the security forces to the Muslims in the government controlled areas of the Northeast." Navamani editorial, May 1, 2003. "[This]
government, which was brought in by Muslims, hesitated, delayed, and was scared [of the LTTE] to get in to action when the Muslims were being attacked
… When the peace process started, the decision to allow a Muslim delegation to take part in peace talks was rejected." Navamani editorial, April 5, 2003.
113 Navamani Editorial titled 'No one can isolate or cheat the Muslims,' February 6, 2004.
114 "Holding talks in foreign countries over two years did not result in anything positive [but] the delay in arriving at a solution made the people think of their
freedom and future." Editorial, February 22, 2004.
115 Navamani editorial, April 7, 2004.
116 Navamani editorial, January 16, 2004, "Vital responsibility of Muslim religious leaders."
117 Navamani editorial, February 16, 2004.
118 Navamani editorial, February 16, 2003: "[Muslims] are also suffering from terrorist war."
confirmed. Only then will there not be a necessity for
arms."119 Warnings such as "even Muslims can stray from
democracy" were situated amid claims of LTTE
harassment.120
SUMMARY
The coverage of the peace process in Sri Lanka's
vernacular press can be seen to have increasingly
coalesced and even polarized, along ethnic (Sinhala,
Tamil, and Muslim) lines. In the Sinhala, Tamil, and
Muslim press there is a strong underlying identification
of the LTTE with the pursuit of Tamil political goals
(independence/autonomy/federalism, etc.), and the Sri
Lankan state with Sinhala dominance and interests. The
Navamani, moreover, became increasingly dismayed
with the lack of a unified Muslim leadership, amid
fractious party politics. This strong identification of
"other" leaderships--and the essentializing of ethnicity
noted above--is not lessened by Sinhala press reports
occasionally adopting a "liberating the Tamils from the
LTTE" thrust, or the Tamil press sometimes
differentiating between "chauvinist elements in the
South" and the Sri Lankan leadership. As such, it can be
argued that the successes of the JVP, the JHU, and the
TNA in the April 2004 polls were assisted by the strong
reinforcement of their electoral positions in the
respective vernacular press. Among Tamil papers,
Suderoli was the most supportive of the LTTE, with
Thinakkural close behind (taking a strongly Tamil
nationalist, rather than directly pro-LTTE stance).
Virakesari was more cautious, usually centering on the
need for "peace" but became increasingly sympathetic to
Tamil political (autonomy) claims. Thinamurusu was the
exception, being strongly critical of the LTTE, but
tempering criticism of, or supporting issues related to,
Tamil interests, including political rights, etc. Among
the Sinhala papers, almost all-except Ravaya and smaller
leftwing papers-adopted strong Sinhala-Buddhist
nationalist positions, albeit to slightly varying degrees.
Divaina was stridently so, Lankadeepa and Lakbima less
overtly. The general reporting and editorial of the party
partisan Sinhala papers, such as the Lanka, also fell
clearly within this nationalist framework and frequently
strongly so.121 In the wake of the February 2002
ceasefire, the Navamani was initially optimistic, but with
the passage of time, amid fears of Muslim
marginalization, became strongly critical of the peace
process, the UNF government, and the LTTE. 
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119 In Navamani editorial of October 3, 2003, "If eastern Muslims seek armed protection," the paper asked: "How long will the Muslim youth tolerate the
atrocities of the armed groups? What will happen if they take up arms?" 
120 Navamani editorial, April 5, 2003.
121 Both the JVP's Lanka and the SLFP's Dinaka often played, sometimes blatantly, on allegations of the UNF's collusion with, or sympathy for, LTTE and Tamils
--more so than corruption, say--to undermine the ruling party's standing among Sinhalese.

Before conducting an analysis of the themes summarized
in the preceding section, coverage of six specific issues is
examined in some detail to illustrate some of the
observed dynamics. As outlined above, these sites
implicitly or explicitly encapsulate an important topic of
controversy and were selected for their potential impact
on perceptions of the peace process. They were also
selected because they received a reasonable amount of
coverage in both the Tamil and Sinhala publications,
and reflect, or are likely to influence, debate on a key
aspect of the peace; and were spread out across the
2002-4 period. There are, of course, several issues that
fit these criteria, but the following sites of inquiry were
selected as a suitably representative sample: the military
high security zones (HSZs); the LTTE's withdrawal
from Norwegian-brokered negotiations in April 2003;
the LTTE's October 2003 proposals for an Interim Self-
Governing Authority (ISGA); the participation of Tamils
resident in LTTE-held areas in the April 2004 elections;
President Kumaratunga's seizure of three ministries from
the UNF government in November 2003; and the
rebellion by the LTTE's Batticaloa-Amparai commander,
Colonel Karuna, in March-April 2004.
SITE 1: HIGH SECURITY ZONES
The Issue
The matter of high security zones dominated the peace
process (particularly the fourth round of talks) in late
December 2002 and January 2003 and resulted in much
acrimony at the negotiations. It also weakened optimism
stemming from the third round of talks (in December
2002 in Norway) at which the LTTE had seemed to
accept federal autonomy and give up its goal of an
independent state. The general thrust of the negotiations
process, in which both sides agreed to give primacy to
urgent humanitarian (resettlement and rehabilitation)
measures over long-term political goals inevitably
brought the HSZs to the fore. The HSZs in Jaffna
comprise up to 30 percent of the peninsula. The
ceasefire agreement of February 2002 stipulated that
civilian buildings (homes, schools, places of worship,
etc.) should be vacated within a specified timetable. This
technically necessitated the withdrawal of SLA forces to
main base camps in Jaffna from the surrounding villages
and areas. Although the SLA moved out of parts of the
town, by and large it remained in place, citing security
concerns. The LTTE insisted on withdrawals as a
precondition for talks (i.e. full implementation of the
CFA), but then relented and entered into negotiations in
September 2002. As such, amid general perceptions of
its climb-down on independence (to federalism), the
LTTE was insistent on a reduction of the HSZs. The
military, however, was seriously concerned about its
vulnerability to LTTE heavy weapons being raised by
the concentration of its dispersed forces. Amid
preparations for the fourth round of talks in which
HSZs were to feature, controversy erupted when the
SLA commander in Jaffna, Maj. Gen. Sarath Fonseka,
wrote a letter flatly refusing to withdraw from HSZs
unless the LTTE disarmed. The international monitors
of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) were also
caught up in the controversy when its head, (retired)
Maj. Gen. Tronde Furohovde, while acknowledging the
SLA's concerns about the "balance of forces" being
shifted by HSZ dismantling, seemed to side with the
SLA. In any case, with President Kumaratunga as the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Prime Minister
Wickremesinghe was reliant on his arch-rival's support
to effect a troop withdrawal. Both the LTTE and the
UNF government sidestepped the HSZ controversy by
agreeing at the Thailand talks to delegate a security sub-
committee to negotiate phased resettlement, initially
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with troops outside the HSZs withdrawing into the
zones, and permitting resettlement in these areas.
KAPS II Context
"Nearly three quarters of Sinhalese respondents
absolutely reject the LTTE idea of eliminating HSZs"
while "Tamils overwhelmingly support the dismantling
of HSZs (95%)" (Social Indicator, 2004, pp.21-22). "An
overwhelming majority of Sinhalese support the
decommissioning of LTTE heavy weapons (89%)" (Ibid,
p.21) and "a clear majority of Tamils (54%) accepts [if it
is the price for peace] the government demand for the
decommissioning of LTTE heavy weapons" (Ibid, p.13).
"Among Muslims, there is support for the dismantling
of HSZs (51%) and decommissioning of LTTE heavy
weapons (84%)" (Ibid, p.22). These numbers must be
seen, moreover, in the light of the KAPS II survey not
including LTTE-controlled parts of the North-East.
How it was Covered
While the Sinhala press generally approached the matter
from a security perspective, with the SLA position in
Jaffna being undermined by its withdrawals from HSZs,
the Tamil press generally approached the matter from
the resettlement angle.122 The latter, however, were
concerned the issue would derail the talks. As such,
Tamil papers saw hardline military leaders, with the
support of President Kumaratunga, resisting the UNF
government's pro-peace moves; while the Sinhala press
saw the LTTE pursuing a military objective (troop
withdrawals) through peace talks, with the "weak" UNF
government at risk of buckling to LTTE pressure. Both
Tamil and Sinhala papers were concerned about a
deadlock in the peace process due to the army's and
LTTE's intransigence. The Lakbima saw the LTTE "on
the offensive" over HSZs.123 The Divaina relegated
LTTE political chief S. P. Tamilselvan's assurances that
the HSZ issue would not derail the peace process to the
inside pages. Sinhala papers gave prominence to military
concerns124 and suggestions that resettlement was a non-
starter anyway.  The JVP-run Lanka reminded the
armed forces of the sacrifices they had made and warned
them not to follow the orders of "political idiots," in
reference to the UNF.126 An editorial in the Suderoli
slammed Gen. Fonseka's letter as "a document that
promotes Sinhala chauvinism, uniting Sinhala
opposition to talks while setting back progress already
made."127 Thinakkural protested that "chauvinism is
taking [a] different shape in the case of HSZs"128 The
Virakesari worried about "chauvinists torpedoing the
government's efforts"129 and welcomed the compromise
at the Thailand talks, noting that the LTTE had climbed
down from its withdrawal demand.130 The Suderoli
hailed the compromise at the Thailand talks (even
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122 Thinakkural, for example, characterized HSZs as "on the whole this region in a way has been plundered from the people of the north in the background of
war. [It is] a conspiracy not to allow the people to live there, which is done under the pretext of HSZ and to infiltrate into areas that people live." On the
issue of Army positions being relocated within Jaffna town, the paper noted: "Not only the LTTE is opposing [this], but also all the Tamils are against such
hypocrisy of the government." Editorial, April 2, 2003. Notably, months earlier, the paper had described the Army's proffered rational for not withdrawing
from HSZs as "convincing." Editorial, January 2, 2003.
123 Lakbima editorial, January 1, 2003.
124 See, for example, an article in Lakbima on January 2, 2003: "Fonseka: we cannot relax defence in Jaffna."
125 E.g. "due to land mines, land disputes and impossibility of identifying real owners" according to a lead story in Divaina on January 2, 2003.
126 Lanka editorial, January 12, 2003.
127 Suderoli editorial, January 1, 2003.
128 Thinakkural editorial, February 19, 2003.
129 Virakesari editorial, January 1, 2003.
130 Virakesari editorial, January 7, 2003.
suggesting this was a success for the LTTE),131 but
condemned the military for not taking steps to
implement the troop withdrawals in the CFA; and
questioned the UNF's motives in "tolerating" this.132
The Thinakkural slammed "malicious communal
forces," singling out Kumaratunga's main opposition PA
party, for stoking a controversy that was going to
undermine (the more important) talks on federalism.133
The paper admitted nonetheless that the army had made
a "convincing" argument.134 The Thinamurusu went
further, citing the SLMM's "balance of forces" argument
and criticizing the LTTE's stance on the HSZs.135
SITE 2: LTTE WITHDRAWAL FROM PEACE TALKS
The Issue
In April 2003, the LTTE declared that it was
"temporarily suspending its participation" in the
Norwegian brokered talks, triggering considerable
uncertainty about the peace process. The LTTE blamed
the government's failure to implement agreements
already reached at the previous rounds of talks and
claimed it was being deliberately marginalized by the
government in efforts to raise donor support for
humanitarian efforts. It cited the holding of a key aid
meeting in Washington, where its attendance--as an
organization proscribed in the United States-was
precluded. The LTTE was strongly criticized by the
United States (particularly through Ambassador Ashley
Wills in Colombo) for its withdrawal from the talks and
came under considerable international pressure to both
resume talks and attend the June 2003 aid conference in
Tokyo.
KAPS II Context
"Tamils are far and away the most optimistic about the
additional benefits of a permanent peace agreement
while Muslims and Sinhalese are most skeptical. Of
course, even if people do not believe that a permanent
peace agreement will provide additional benefits beyond
those provided by the ceasefire, they may still support a
permanent peace out of fear that a return to war would
inflict serious costs on themselves or the country. There
is near unanimous agreement that a breakdown of the
peace negotiations would seriously damage Sri Lankan
society. … Moreover, while Sinhalese respondents view
the possible resumption of war in less dramatic terms,
the other ethnic groups, and majorities within all ethnic
groups, think resumption of the war would damage
virtually all aspects of the country's life" (Social
Indicator, 2004, p.41). "Among the different ethnic
groups, the war has taken the greatest toll on Sri Lanka's
three minority groups, more than 95% of whom report
suffering directly in multiple ways" (Ibid, p.39). "About
one third of the Sinhalese respondents report no direct
experiences with the war, another third report having
friends or neighbors who were in the war, while another
third report direct suffering as a result of the war" (Ibid).
"Those who have suffered most in the war, are more
likely to support a majority of the peace proposals and
also are much more willing to protest an unjust or
spoiled peace agreement" (Ibid, p.39, emphasis added).
How it was Covered
The Sinhala press and the Thinamurusu saw the LTTE's
quitting the negotiations as indicative of its inability to
win concessions from the government at the talks.
Lakbima welcomed the scrutiny the LTTE's withdrawal
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131 Suderoli editorial, January 9, 2003.
132 Suderoli editorial, January 7, 2003.
133 Thinakkural editorial, January 1, 2003
134 Thinakkural editorial, January 2, 2003
135 Thinamurusu editorial, January 2, 2003
would draw from the international community,136
though the paper later admitted that the LTTE's
protests "cannot be totally rejected."137 Divaina said the
LTTE's withdrawal was entirely in character: "The only
surprise the LTTE could have given us was to carry out
peace talks as long as it takes to find a solution."138 They
also saw the LTTE move as an opportunistic tactic to
pressure the government, given international donors'
linking of Sri Lanka's aid to progress in the peace
talks.139 The LTTE was seen to be switching tactics in
the face of the government's resolute stand on the HSZs
and the LTTE in general. This was evidenced by the
sinking of an LTTE arms vessel in March 2003 and the
government's refusal to formally recognize the Sea Tigers
through a naval route agreement. Lankadeepa, like other
Sinhala papers, welcomed U.S. criticism of the LTTE's
actions and defended the organization's exclusion from
the Washington talks on the basis that it had yet to give
up terrorism.140 They argued the LTTE wouldn't have
quit the talks if it were seriously concerned about
improving the hardships of the Tamils through peace.141
Thinamurusu suggested renewed war was a possibility as
the LTTE had no cards left to play. However Ravaya
condemned those spreading fears of renewed fighting,
singling out President Kumaratunga in this regard and
arguing that although the LTTE "was not an honest
organization," it had reiterated its commitment to the
truce and the president was trying to push it back to
war.142 Divaina urged the government to stand up to the
LTTE's brinkmanship.143 Later, perhaps amid concern
international aid might be blocked by the LTTE's refusal
to participate in talks, Lankadeepa adopted a more
conciliatory posture ("the northeast cannot be made
normal with one stroke of the pen") and urged "both
sides to become more flexible."144
The rest of the Tamil press either accepted or did not
question the LTTE's proffered rationale, but also pushed
strongly for the resumption of talks, arguing this was
popular Tamil sentiment.145 Arguing that the LTTE was
echoing popular Tamil frustration at government failure
to take humanitarian steps in Tamil areas, Suderoli said
the LTTE's withdrawal was not unexpected and that the
"ball is now in the government court."146 Thinakkural
urged the LTTE and government back to the table,
noting that Sinhala nationalist forces--in reference to the
president and main opposition--were intent on further
disrupting the peace process.147 Virakesari notably urged
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136 See for example, Lakbima editorial, April 24, 2003.
137 Acknowledging "normalcy has not returned to the northeast yet," the paper called -- amid intensifying acrimony between the premier and president -- for
political stability to achieve this. (Lakbima editorial, June 12, 2003).
138 Divaina editorial, April 23, 2003.
139 A Lakbima editorial on April 24, 2003, called it a "superb opportunity to intensify bargaining; talks [are] a weapon to further subdue the government."
140 Lankadeepa editorial, April 27, 2003.
141 Ibid: "If the LTTE, who claim to be sole representatives of Tamil people, want to see their people getting these benefits, they must come back to peace talks."
142 Ravaya editorial, April 27, 2003.
143 Divaina editorial of April 23, 2003: "Are they [government leaders] going to [be] puppets dancing to the tune of terrorism, or rise up like men and face the
LTTE terrorism courageously?" 
144 The Lankadeepa argued: "If there are problems, they must be discussed peacefully and if the government and the LTTE were able to achieve tougher issues
like reaching a ceasefire and starting peace talks, we cannot see how the other matters cannot be resolved in a similar way." But it also criticized the LTTE
for not failing "to give a clear pledge that they are willing to give up terrorism" (Editorial, May 18, 2003).
145 Thinakkural editorial on May 17, 2003 noted that the "root cause of all the problems has been resettlement and the stance of the army." 
146 "The people were anticipating problems in the peace talks, because of the carelessness of the government regarding the peace process and its not
implementing the decisions already made to develop the northeast." (Suderoli editorial, April 23, 2003).
147 Thinakkural editorial, April 28, 2003.
the LTTE to compromise and resume talks, pointing out
that the Sinhala parties (including the UNF), were
seemingly unconcerned by the Tigers' withdrawal148 and
pointed out: "The LTTE also has to contribute to build
up the NorthEast [by participating at the Tokyo aid
conference]."149 The paper later seemed to sympathize
with the LTTE's argument that decisions reached must
be implemented.150 Suderoli said the LTTE's flexibility in
the previous year had come to an end151 and called on
the Tamil people to "demonstrate their support" for its
actions. Suderoli also condemned U.S. "hypocrisy" for
deliberately keeping the LTTE out of the aid meeting
and then condemning it without taking account of its
reasons for withdrawing from the talks.152 The Tamil
papers generally accepted the LTTE's reiterated
commitment to the ceasefire,153 but were worried about
Sinhala nationalist elements (including President
Kumaratunga) further weakening the peace process.154
The Navamani was anxious about the LTTE's
withdrawal from the talks, particularly in the context of
simmering Tamil-Muslim tensions in Trincomalee, but
accepted the LTTE's rationale for withdrawing.155 One
op-ed in the paper subsequently urged the LTTE to
attend the donor talks arguing "destruction of the
Northeast has not been due to one sector alone. The
government dropped bombs and destroyed, while the
LTTE destroyed … by bombs and landmines. Therefore
it is the responsibility of both sides to restore [the
NorthEast]."153 Another said: "Flexibility is necessary for
the government and LTTE in utilizing international aid,
if they are concerned with the plight of the people
affected by war."157 The paper worried that "threats to
the peace process are on the increase,"158 and argued for
a resumption of talks and urged compromise: "All the
communities have suffered in the war. It is the wish of
all the people that another war should not happen under
any circumstances."159
SITE 3: INTERIM ADMINISTRATION AND ISGA
The Issue
Following its withdrawal from the Norwegian-brokered
talks in April 2003, the LTTE raised the issue of an
interim administration for the North-East. Although the
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148 Virakesari editorial, May 5, 2003.
149 Virakesari editorial, May 8, 2003.
150 Pointing out that "assistance does not reach the people to whom it is given by the international community [and] it is a well-known fact that such funds go
into the pockets of ministers and officials," Virakesari noted that "government is keen in securing financial aid, while LTTE is keen in getting the decisions
implemented" (Editorial, May 9, 2003).
151 Suderoli editorial, April 24, 2003, "Flexibility ends and persistence begins."
152 Suderoli editorial, May 4, 2003.
153 But they did not consider the LTTE blameless for the impasse. A Thinakkural editorial of May 7, 2003 pointed out "the problems caused by the movements
of the Sea Tigers and the stance taken by the SLMM [in calling for a sea corridor for the LTTE] have also caused contradictions." 
154 Amid fresh reports of an imminent PA-JVP alliance, Thinakkural and Suderoli both fretted over prospects for peace in their editorials of  May 21, 2003.
155 "The reason shown by the LTTE for boycotting the Japan talks are indeed important", said the April 27 editorial in Navamani , "LTTE suspending participation
in the peace talks, is also dangerous to Muslims."
156 Navamani op-ed, June 8, 2003 "If LTTE does not participate in the Tokyo confab."
157 Navamani op-ed, June 15, 2003.
158 "Dialogue between the government and the LTTE is also diminishing, and the statements of the LTTE are also hardening," said a June 22, 2003 article in
Navamani, "Warning activities not good for country."
159 "Therefore the government and the LTTE must not budge an inch from the peace path. Both sides have the dimension to compromise to find peace."
Navamani editorial, June 22, 2003, "Peace, only if government and LTTE act intelligently."
notion was officially framed as an overarching structure
for rehabilitation and reconstruction, it was (not
unexpectedly) understood among ordinary Sri Lankans
in the context of an LTTE-dominated structure of
governance. As such, there was an immediate
polarization between Tamil and Sinhala quarters on the
notion. While the interim administration was viewed by
the former as a stepping stone to a federal solution
(which, it was widely believed, the LTTE would finally
settle for); it was viewed by the latter as first step to a
separate state (which, it was widely argued, the LTTE
would never give up). However, the UNF government,
which had mooted the idea of an interim administration
in its 2001 election manifesto, wasn't put off. However,
three sets of proposals raised by the UNF were rejected
by the LTTE, which subsequently declared its intent to
submit its own proposals, to be drawn up by its officials
and expatriate academics. Drafted at a series of meetings
in Europe, the LTTE submitted its proposal for an
Interim Self-Governing Authority in October 2003. The
notion of an interim administration became charged in
the intervening period and, notably, there was concern
in some sections of Tamils in the South about a Sinhala
backlash. The maximalist position set out in the ISGA
proposals took many by surprise, though some,
including international voices, tacitly welcomed it as at
least a starting point for negotiations. But it infuriated
Sinhala hardliners who were already suspicious and
resentful of the UNF, which, perhaps confident of
whittling the LTTE's demands down at the negotiations,
had expressed its preparedness to negotiate over the
structure even before the ISGA proposals were
submitted.
KAPS II Context
According to the Social Indicator, KAPS II found that
Tamils overwhelmingly support demands for an ISGA
(94 percent) but "nearly three quarters of Sinhalese
respondents absolutely reject the LTTE demand for an
ISGA." Among Muslims a slim majority (51 percent)
supported the creation of an LTTE ISGA (2004, pp.21-
22). Given its provision for respondents to dislike a
proposal but accept it "as the price of peace," KAPS II
notes that "the Sinhala rejection of the LTTE demand
for an ISGA poses a major obstacle to commencing
negotiations" (Ibid, p.22). In particular, "while bundles
almost always produce some positive change in public
support for the less-favored proposal in the package, the
change in public acceptance toward the proposals aimed
at creating an LTTE ISGA is, however, generally modest
and not sufficient to produce majority acceptance" (Ibid,
p.6). On the other hand, "the creation of an ISGA, a
principal demand of the LTTE, is considered absolutely
necessary by almost 20% of Sri Lankans," (Ibid, p.15) a
significant number, given that Tamils comprise 13
percent of the populace and Muslims 7 percent.160
How it was Covered
The Sinhala press was generally strongly critical of the
notion of an interim administration, saying it was
tantamount to dismembering the country. The first time
the idea161 was raised in May 2003, Divaina asserted,
"we strongly feel that this step must not be taken as they
[UNF] have not got public consent for it."162 The paper
also argued an interim administration under the LTTE
would comprise a stepping stone to a separate state and
that it was illegal (i.e. unconstitutional) to form one.163
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160 Estate Tamils make up 5.6 percent of the population, Sri Lankan Tamils 12.6 percent, Muslims 7.4 percent, and Sinhalese 74 percent. Stanley Tambiah (1986)
Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy (University of Chicago Press), pp.3-4
161 Often characterized in Sinhala media as LTTE "demands" rather than "proposals."
162 In the same editorial of May 26, 2003, the paper argued: "[It means] subjecting Sinhala and Muslim people to serious danger, while also granting a separate
state unofficially."
163 Divaina editorial, June 9, 2003 titled 'The Interim Administration Trap'
Before the LTTE's own proposals came out, there was
concerted criticism and not inconsiderable speculation
and suspicion. Lanka, for example, even claimed that the
LTTE would be seeking a new parliament and a new
flag for the North-East.164 Divaina protested that
allowing the LTTE "to run the Northeast without it
surrendering arms would be like granting Eelam in
another name."165 Amid reports the LTTE's proposals
were nearing completion, Lankadeepa launched a bitter
attack on V. Rudrakumar, the LTTE lawyer supervising
the drafting.166 On the other hand, following the Tokyo
aid conference in June 2003 in which aid was tied to the
progress in the peace process, Lakbima, argued that
although "granting what the LTTE demands in full, is
also not possible" the [UNF] government "should reach
a new agreement with the LTTE."167 The paper was less
antagonistic amid reports the UNF would involve other
parties in discussions.168 Reacting to the ISGA when it
was published, Divaina noted "the LTTE is obviously
demanding everything through these proposals of theirs
other than funds to construct a massive wall to separate
the NorthEast from the rest of the country." Ravaya,
however, thought "it was only natural" that the LTTE
would ask for the maximum with the expectation of
compromising at talks later; and arguing that division of
the country could only be forestalled by establishing
Tamil autonomy, felt an interim administration was
necessary until then.169 While Sinhala papers were
concerned that an interim administration might become
a reality in some form, Thinamurusu suggested the
LTTE was not really interested in such an ISGA per se.
But by asking for something clearly outside the
constitution they argued it was deploying a tactic to
keep the talks stalled. Interestingly, before the ISGA
proposals came out, Thinamurusu was even slightly
supportive of the notion of an interim administration.170
The other Tamil papers conversely saw an interim
administration, particularly given the proposals drawn
up by the LTTE itself, as an opportunity to resume the
stalled peace process. Amid political turmoil in the
South and fears that Sinhala opponents of the peace
process were gaining ground on the UNF; the
resumption of talks, more so than the outcome of any
negotiations, seemed the greater concern. Yet from the
outset of the idea of an interim administration first
being raised in May 2003, there was also support for
such a structure. Thinakkural said such a body was
necessary to ensure funds were spent in "the most proper
way"171 and slammed Sinhalese opponents as
"chauvinists."172 Suderoli and Virakesari argued that the
LTTE's interim administration demand was not a new
idea and the UNF had already accepted the principle
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164 See, for example, Lanka October 12, 2003 articles "Tigers constructing massive parliamentary complex in Vanni" and 'Tigers propose to remove lion from
flag."
165 Divaina editorial, October 28, 2003.
166 See, for example, Lankadeepa editorial, September 1, 2003, "More foreign support needed to curb Tiger terrorism."
167 Lakbima editorial, June 12, 2003.
168 It also argued: "We must break away from the debilitating tradition of opposing anything and everything," and urged other parties to accept the Premier's
invitation (Editorial, September 23, 2003).
169 Ravaya editorial, June 8, 2003.
170 It argued that "if the Tigers put forward any alternative proposal, it would mean that they have dropped the Tamil Eelam concept," and noted that "the
international community is keen to evaluate a document that would be tabled by the LTTE." As such "this opportunity should not be taken as one just to
expose the government, but it must be used well to think of the best for the Tamil people" (Editorial, August 31, 2003).
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earlier.173 Virakesari argued that a way forward had to be
found beyond the constitution.174 Suderoli argued an
interim administration was "the desire of the Tamil
people."175 Among Tamil papers there was considerable
anxiety that the Sinhala right, particularly the JVP, was
stepping up efforts to further undermine the stalled
Norwegian initiative. As such, Virakesari--which had
initially hailed the "narrowing of the LTTE and UNF
positions" (i.e. both agreeing to negotiate an interim
administration)--was taken aback by the maximalist and
seemingly provocative content of the ISGA proposals.176
Acknowledging the LTTE argument that the Sri Lankan
constitution was not accepted by the Tamils and that an
interim administration was not possible within that
framework, the paper also lamented that the ISGA draft
was "fundamentally different" from what the
government had countenanced for an interim
administration.177 Virakesari also pointed out that the
ISGA draft had not been accepted by the JVP, the
president, or the Muslim SLMC; but urged negotiations
between the government and the LTTE, noting that
compromise would be necessitated as a result. The
paper's calls for talks later became more forceful amid
deepening political turmoil in the South. Criticizing the
major Sinhala parties for past "empty promises" to the
Tamils, it also called for unity among the "Tamil-
speaking leadership" for a durable settlement.
Thinakkural felt that "the Tiger proposals [have] created
uproar in the south, … [but] even if [excessive], could
be discussed to arrive at a compromise."178 Suderoli
argued forcefully that the Sri Lankan constitution
("drawn on the basis of Sinhala domination") could not
be allowed to be an impediment to the establishment of
an interim administration. Calling on the UNF to "have
the courage" to go beyond the constitution, the paper
said the "ball was in the government's court."179 The
paper avoided comment on the ISGA content itself, but
before the proposals came out was urging the UNF
government to challenge the opposition's campaign against
an interim administration for the North-East. In the wake
of the UPFA's victory and its preparedness to commence
talks, Thinakkural was unhappy at the LTTE's refusal to
negotiate on the ISGA in parallel with a permanent
solution, saying this was an obstruction to negotiations.180
Acknowledging that "the matter of interim
administration has often been forwarded ever since
1987, even in the Indo-Sri Lanka accord," the Navamani
apprehensively noted that "Muslims are awfully worried
as to what would be their position if an interim
administration is entrusted to the LTTE."181 The central
issue was that the paper saw the interim administration
"connected with the devolution of powers."182 Its anxiety
increased as the UNF government put forward its
proposals; and amid palpable fears that Muslims would
be marginalized in an LTTE-GoSL deal, the paper
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welcomed Muslim politicians of all parties to unite
behind common proposals of their own.183 Yet the paper
also feared Muslims being blamed for the failure of talks
amid UNF-PA hostility. It noted: "If the Muslims will
put forward proposals of their own, the [Sinhala]
chauvinist media will give undue propaganda to
them…If the talks on the Interim Administration get
disrupted Muslims will be blamed in the end."184
SITE 4: PRESIDENT KUMARATUNGA'S SEIZURE OF
THREE MINISTRIES
The Issue
Within days of the LTTE submitting its ISGA proposals,
President Kumaratunga moved to seize three key
ministries, including defense, from the UNF government.
She also suspended Parliament for several weeks.
Crucially, she did so citing security concerns, alleging that
the UNF had weakened the country's defenses in two
years of peace. There were severe consequences for the
peace process. The UNF government refused to be
responsible for the ceasefire agreement without control of
the defense ministry. Much discussion of a "national"
government, a UNF-PA alliance, failed to produce
stability and raised anxieties over the peace process. Hopes
fell further as the LTTE backed away, questioning who
was in charge of Sri Lanka, and thus who the legitimate
negotiating partner would be. Asking the same question,
Norway suspended its facilitatory role pending "clarity" in
Sri Lanka's governance, and amid severe international
criticism of President Kumratunga's actions. The turmoil
continued until April 2004 when the UPFA (the SLFP-
JVP alliance forged that January) defeated the UNF.
KAPS II Context
This site was selected for three reasons outlined in the
KAPS survey. First, the survey found divisions within
the Sinhalese community. As it noted: "UNF supporters
are significantly more likely to be activist supporters of
the peace process (by 37% vs. 30%) whereas UPFA
members are more likely to be activist opponents of the
process (by 32% to 25%)" (Social Indicator, 2004, p.25).
Second, it found that "Sri Lankans who most trust the
President are more likely to oppose a compromise peace
agreement, although their opposition tends to be more
passive" and that "trust for the President and army is
much higher among Sinhalese respondents and lower
among minority ethnic groups"(Ibid, p.6). Third, KAPS
II discovered latent support among all communities for
non-democratic rule. Although Sri Lankans say "they
want a fully democratic country, which they do not now
think they have, they also are willing in large numbers to
abolish their existing democracy in favor of various
forms of undemocratic rule" (Ibid, p.31). Moreover,
"when asked specifically whether Sri Lanka would be
better off if it were governed by strong leaders, i.e. by
experts or religious leaders making decisions they think
best for the country, large numbers of Sri Lankans
embrace each of these alternatives to democracy" (Ibid,
p.31). The Sinhalese, the report noted, "are by far the
most supportive of rule by a strong leader, while large
majorities of all groups favored rule by unelected experts"
(Ibid).
How it was Reported
Initially, Sinhala papers were welcoming of President
Kumaratunga's actions, but as international criticism
mounted they urged compromise and cohabitation with
Premier Wickremesinghe. Lakbima argued that "the
decisions made by the President are closely linked to the
security and economy of the country" and urged the
general public to look at it in "the right perspective" as
this was the only way to "divert the crisis created by the
President's actions for the betterment of the country."185
Divaina declared, "the taking over of these ministries by
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the President, vitally needed to rectify the damage
caused by relevant authorities not taking adequate steps
to ensure national security, is correct, although we
cannot approve of the way it was done."186 The paper
said the president had been compelled to act as the
conduct of the ministries "would not be tolerated even
by gods, let alone the President" and urged the
government to work with her.187 Divaina felt her actions
"did not create any anger among [the] people."
Lankadeepa was alarmed by international criticism and
called, like the other Sinhala papers, for cohabitation
rather than a return of the three ministries to the
UNF.188 Divaina rejected Tamil criticisms, asking why
the peace process "is going to suffer because she has
taken over three extremely corrupt ministries" and
pointed out that (unlike Wickremesinghe) Kumaratunga
knew how to stand up to "a highly inflexible and
cunning group [the LTTE]."189 As the standoff
continued, Sinhala papers grew more critical of what
they saw as the self-interested actions of the two main
parties.190
The Tamil papers were strongly critical of
Kumaratunga's actions.191 Suderoli slammed the
president's "immature and dictatorial action" and
pointed to the displeasure of "the local and international
community."192 The paper called on her to "be more
responsible," arguing that although "the actions of the
President were legal, [the move] certainly is not
moral."193 Virakesari said Kumaratunga's actions had
"effectively stalled the peace process and all the benefits
reaped by the one and a half year ceasefire are at stake."
The paper also lamented that "at the beginning of her
tenure as President [Kumaratunga] was interested in the
peace process but as time passed decided that war could
be the solution."194 Virakesari argued "it is pertinent to
ask the question why every time some settlement is in
sight, the issue of national security and the formation of
a national government are raised?  Is it that the
settlement of the Tamil problem will cause a threat to
national security?"195 Thinakkural went further: "Sinhala
political leaders or the communalistic parties will never
agree to grant the rightful aspirations of the Tamil
people."196 The paper was suspicious of a "national"
government, saying that it "seems to be a ploy to unite
the Sinhala elements to erode the power of the Tamil
leaderships."197 Suderoli pointed out that, given the
hostility between the LTTE and President Kumaratunga,
talks were unlikely now and that the Tigers would wait
until the crisis played itself out.198 Other papers criticized
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the "unnecessary political crisis"199 which had "stalled the
search for permanent peace, economic development."200
Thinamurusu also argued "we are unable to point out
anyone who could be considered the one who could
bring redress to the Tamils," but also said the two
leaders' reluctance to lead the peace process "shows the
extent to which the LTTE's [ISGA] proposals has
problems within it."201 Suderoli said the LTTE's assertion
that "a settlement could be reached only outside the
constitution has been proved by the [crisis]."202
The Navamani avoided taking sides on the matter, a
position no doubt influenced by the political horse-
trading in which SLMC leader Rauf Hakeem was
involved. But in an editorial titled, "Political
cohabitation," the paper ambiguously stated: "Every party
which came into power since independence has governed
the country with a communal flavor. Talk of a 'national
government' encompassing political parties is not enough,
the different communities must get together." Notably the
paper gave prominent coverage to Hakeem's calls for
compromise between the two Sinhala leaders.203
SITE 5: ENABLING TAMILS IN LTTE-HELD AREAS
TO VOTE
The Issue
When political turmoil in the South precipitated fresh
parliamentary elections in April 2004, the notion of
participation by Tamils living in LTTE, controlled areas
arose, not least because it received the support of the
LTTE, whose proxy, the TNA was expected to do well.
This resulted in considerable controversy. There were
problems with situating polling booths in LTTE-
controlled areas as the LTTE would not permit armed
Sri Lankan security escorts to enter its controlled areas.
Concentrating booths in government-held territory close
to the frontlines was also problematic, as security forces
were wary of LTTE operatives crossing over and
mingling with large crowds. There were also suspicions
that the military might block Tamil voters, as had
happened to many people in the East in the 2001 polls.
A compromise was established with booths being
clustered on the government-held side close to the
frontlines and the security forces agreeing to scale back
security checks and easing crossing delays on the day.
Large numbers of people crossed the frontlines to vote,
resulting in considerable success for the TNA.
KAPS II Context
This site was included given the KAPS II observation of
a potential contradiction in Sri Lankans' attitudes to
democracy and political tolerance. To begin with, the
survey found that "members of all ethnic groups in Sri
Lanka believe in democracy as an ideal" (Social Indicator,
2004, p.31). When "respondents were then asked
whether they were willing to allow members of their
least favorite group to stand for election to parliament,
hold a protest march in Colombo, give a speech
advocating a controversial issue…they are not at all
tolerant." In particular, "more than 60% agree that a
member from their most disliked group should not be
allowed to stand for election to parliament" (Ibid, p.33).
Two-thirds disagreed with their most disliked groups
being allowed to hold a protest march or making a
speech in their community. "Although the majority of
Sri Lankans embrace the right to protest a peace
agreement they personally do not like, most do not
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extend this right to those they dislike" (Ibid). The survey
found that "LTTE supporters were the most disliked,
with two-thirds selecting them [while] about 15% of
respondents chose Sinhala nationalists as their least liked
group" (Ibid). This polarization must inevitably be
considered both in the light of the ethnicity-based
observations highlighted in KAPS II and, particularly in
this case, the survey not being conducted in LTTE-
controlled areas.
How it was Covered
The Sinhala press was hostile to elections being staged in
LTTE-controlled territory, while the Tamil press
vehemently argued that people in these areas must be
allowed to vote, pointing out the blocking of these
voters' access in the 2001 polls. The issue raised starkly
partisan language. Noting that if Tamils in LTTE-held
areas couldn't vote it was the fault of the LTTE,
Lankadeepa praised the elections commissioner when he
refused to permit booths in LTTE held areas without
armed security forces escort.204 There was also opposition
to the LTTE suggestion that international monitors
could supervise elections in its controlled areas205 Ravaya,
however, backed the idea, asserting people "in LTTE
areas should not be deprived of their voting rights."206
Suderoli asserted, "the Tamil community wishes to
exhibit their aspirations and intentions to the world
through this election… [They must be] given the chance
to vote independently."207 Arguing that not permitting
people in LTTE-held areas to vote "will deny the Tamils
the chance to show Tamil unity and the need for self-
governance to the world," Thinakkural protested that
"the [Tamils] fifty-year freedom struggle is being
[undermined] in the elections."208 Noting that the TNA
could become a powerful player in a hung parliament,"
Virakesari worried the security forces would again
deliberately prevent Tamils from crossing to vote. The
paper argued: "The Tamil problem has been a long-
standing one and the weapon the Tamil has is his vote…
[a way must be found] to ensure he gets the chance to
vote."209 Thinakkural went further: "The TNA must be
returned with such a majority to not only convince the
international community, but the communal forces of
the south about Tamil unity."210 Suderoli also argued "it
is the duty of the Tamils to give a clear mandate [to the
TNA]." Condemning the LTTE for destroying
democracy in the North-East, Divaina dismissed the
TNA as "faithful dogs"211 and "the parliamentary wing"
of the LTTE. Thinamurusu attacked the TNA, saying its
members had abandoned their history and traditions in
supporting the LTTE. Conversely, the anti-LTTE EPDP
faced hostility, even from the moderate Virakesari.212
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Even when the idea of elections in LTTE-controlled
areas was raised a year earlier, the Navamani was
enthusiastic, arguing that "all those who are eligible to
vote must have the right to go to the polls."213 In the
wake of the TNA's victory, the paper observed: "After a
lapse of many years the people in the Tiger-controlled
areas voted with much enthusiasm. The Tamils have
demonstrated their affinity for peace and democracy.
They did not talk of separation but of a united Lanka.
The unity of the Tamils has exhibited their commitment
to peace."214
SITE 6: KARUNA'S SPLIT FROM THE LTTE
The Issue
Until early 2004, the LTTE's Batticaloa-Amparai
Commander, Colonel Karuna, was one of the LTTE's
senior-most leaders. He was a recognized as a "war
hero" having been accredited with defeating the SLA's
largest offensive, Operation Jaya Sikirui, in 1997-8,
and was also one of the LTTE's negotiators during the
Norwegian-facilitated rounds. In March 2004, Karuna
declared he was splitting from the LTTE, along with a
substantial body of the organization's troops. Citing
discrimination against eastern Tamils by the LTTE's
northern-based leadership, he initially declared his
intent to wage a separate struggle in the East, and
called for a collaborative effort. Later, condemning
LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran, he denounced
the LTTE's goal of independence. Karuna sought a
separate ceasefire agreement with the Sri Lankan
government and separate negotiations under
Norwegian facilitation. Both were rejected by Sri
Lanka (whose government changed during his
rebellion) and Norway respectively. After a six-week
standoff the war of words escalated, with Karuna
asserting control of a territorial and organizational
stronghold in the East and the LTTE dismissing his
challenge as a lone individual's insubordination. The
rebellion was eventually crushed in a swift LTTE
offensive over the Easter weekend. Notably, the Sri
Lankan armed forces, despite persistent reports to be
backing Karuna with weapons and supplies, remained
on the sidelines during the LTTE offensive. Karuna
escaped, defecting to the SLA along with his loyalists.
Since then a low-intensity but vicious cycle of violence
has plagued the East. While neither the UNF
government nor the new UPFA government felt able to
recognize Karuna, after his defection the cycle of
violence escalated, with the LTTE alleging that Sri
Lankan military intelligence was waging a covert war in
his name. The escalating violence is said by many, not
least the international truce monitors, to be seriously
undermining the three-year-old truce.
KAPS II Context
The survey noted: "Very few respondents (11%) think
the split in the LTTE has helped the peace process.
Most (59%) think the split will have little effect in this
regard while 31% think it will hurt the peace
negotiations." (Social Indicator, 2004, p.42). Moreover,
"those who think the split in the LTTE has hurt the
peace process are the most supportive of that process"
(Ibid).
How it was Covered
The Sinhala papers were delighted with the split in the
LTTE, while the Tamil papers were appalled. Divaina
said "a massive stumbling block that had been
destroying the progress of our country, has now cracked
decisively and it is also obvious that these cracks would
expand and ultimately destroy this curse."215 The paper,
which quickly obtained an exclusive interview with
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Karuna, mocked the TNA for the dilemma it now
faced216 and said: "The question here is whether our own
[divided Sinhala] society is ready to reap the harvest of
this development?"217 Having in the past described
Karuna as a "murderer"218 and a "bloodthirsty killer,"219
Divanina now said: "Karuna is definitely a character to
reckon with. The personality and charisma he developed
as the Eastern commander of the LTTE was further
polished when he took part in peace talks."220 Other
Sinhala papers were not so explicit, but were clearly
welcoming of the prospects of a self-destructive clash
within the LTTE.
In contrast, Tamil papers were fearful of the prospects of
such violence and, more explicitly, a serious weakening
of the Tamil cause. Immediately after news of Karuna's
rebellion broke, Tamil papers sought to play it down,
while Sinhala papers asserted there was a definite split
within the LTTE.221 Shortly afterward, as Sinhala papers
carried sensational and inaccurate reports of major
clashes between both factions,222 Tamil papers gave
prominence to LTTE assurances that the matter would
be resolved without violence.223 As Sinhala papers carried
reports of the split spreading into the wider Tamil
community,224 Tamil papers stressed the reverse.225
Nevertheless, Tamil papers highlighted "anti-Tamil"
actions by Karuna, including expulsions of non-eastern
Tamils from Batticaloa. In particular, while giving
coverage to Karuna's accusations of regional
discrimination by the LTTE leadership, the Tamil press
also gave publicity to refutations of these.226
Editorially, Tamil papers first maintained silence and
then urged reconciliation227 amid palpable shock and
dismay. Notably, there were unusually strong messages of
"Tamil" identification among the press. Thinakkural, for
example argued, "it is important to remember that our
strength is in unity."228 Virakesari said the "Tamil
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community hangs its head in shame."229 Suderoli argued,
"the Tamil freedom struggle is at a critical juncture and
Tamil unity assumes utmost importance now."230
Thinakkural observed: "The split among the Tiger
leadership who bravely fought for the Tamil cause,
without a thought for their own lives, spells the end of
the road for the Tamil struggle: the split will ruin
everything."231 Virakesari said of the gathering
mobilization behind the TNA: "The Tamils have been
forced to unite to win their aspirations. Political parties
understanding the feelings of the public are campaigning
for peace. It will be not be an exaggeration to state, that
it was the dedication and commitment of the Tigers
brought about this situation."232 Given this sense of
solidarity, Suderoli's appeal on March 11 for unity
among the Tamil media "at this critical time" acquires
new significance, particularly amid undisguised glee in
the Sinhala and (Sinhala-owned) English press.233 As
Suderoli put it: "The Tamil media has decided that they
will not assist the regional cry and are reporting with
restraint and responsibility. The media could help the
Tamil community out of this crisis with minimum
damage. The majority community, which looked at the
Tamil unity with awe, is laughing at it now."234 The
latter point may have contributed to further closing of
ranks. Virakesari, pointing out that "those who opposed
peace and espoused a communal line…led by the
JVP…are rejoicing," called for Tamils "to forget
regionalism and forge unity."235
For the Tamil papers, there were two immediate causes
of concern: first, they were fearful of the implications of
inter-LTTE clashes. Thinakkural, for example, pleaded
against recourse to violence.236 Second, it was felt the
electoral momentum behind the TNA was going to
disintegrate. As the Divaina delightedly pointed out,
"LTTE splitting up means votes of TNA is also going to
split. The rest of the Tamil votes in the country too
could face a serious division with the uncertainty over
the real leader of the LTTE."237 One Virakesari front
page even gave prominence to the TNA election
campaign over the developing crisis in the East.238
Noting that "Tamils wanted to stand united to exhibit
their aspirations and win their rights [in this election],"
Thinakkural lamented the split.239 Suderoli declared:
"The voting at the coming election should be united
and ensure that the Tamil homeland remains united."240
Virakesari pointed out "it was also envisaged that TNA
would be the deciding power in the formation of a
[new] government."241 When it became clear there would
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be no major confrontation between the LTTE and
Karuna's forces, and that the TNA's campaign wasn't
necessarily going to be undermined, Tamil coverage
became less frantic, but was decidedly hostile to
Karuna.242 Many papers gave prominence to comments
by LTTE political strategist, Anton Balasingham, that
Karuna's rebellion was a "temporary aberration."243 The
central issue seemed Karuna's rejection of a Tamil
homeland. Condemning this, Suderoli argued, "it is
imperative that the voters of the East teach a lesson to
those who are talking of regionalism."244 Indeed, with
time editorial comment and coverage grew bolder,245 and
shortly afterward, in late March, Thinakkural was
banned in areas controlled by Karuna's forces.246
Following the collapse of Karuna's rebellion over the
Easter weekend, Divaina was contemptuous of the "dud
cracker": "Karuna should have realized from the
beginning that he is getting involved in a struggle he can
never win."247 Suderoli was equally dismissive: "The
Tamils knew Karuna's fate when he announced that he
was going his own way [from the LTTE] in March. The
Tamils realized that he had no policy other than to whip
up regionalism. The media was carried away by Karuna's
declarations of power and the media's imaginative
reporting carried Karuna away."248
But it was the escalating cycle of violence in the
aftermath of Karuna's defeat and the UPFA
government's coming to power that contributed most to
Tamil publications' pessimism about the peace process.
As LTTE cadres and Karuna loyalists died in attacks and
counter-attacks, Virakesari rebuked both the LTTE and
the government, but seemed to accept the LTTE's
rationale.249 Suderoli was more direct: "The fact remains
that an organized [anti-LTTE] gang is active in the East.
It is not possible for a group to operate without the
knowledge of the Tigers and the Army. It is not possible
for an armed group like Karuna faction to operate from
government-controlled areas without the knowledge of
the Army."250 As violence escalated Virakesari also
become blunter, arguing that "Eastern violence should
be crushed." The paper also protested: "After Karuna
was chased out…many Karuna supporters have joined
the army and with [its] blessings have been committing
many murders and illegal acts… The army has to answer
for these atrocities."251 Shortly afterward a well-known
contributor to the Virakesari, Aiyathurai Nadesan, was
shot dead on May 31, 2004, reportedly by the Karuna
group ((RSF, 2004a, p.2). The story dominated the front
pages of Tamil, Sinhala, and English language
newspapers the next day, but only the Tamil press and
some English papers covered the subsequent anti-Karuna
public protests in the North-East over the slaying.
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242 News reports associated Karuna with the Sri Lanka military and feared army backed paramilitaries and local defiance under Karuna's authority. See for
example, Suderoli, March 16, 2004, "Batticaloa traders refuse to accept Karuna's order" and "Karuna against homeland policy." Thinakkural, March 16, 2004,
"America (said) behind Karuna's decision." Virakesari, March 16, 2004, "Karuna becomes American stooge?" Thinakkural, March 17, 2004, "PLOT Mohan
meets Karuna"; Ibid, March 19, "Karuna's attempts to establish contact [with government] rejected"; "Helicopters flying into [Karuna's] areas in the east."
Suderoli, March 19, 2004 "President rejects overtures by Karuna." Thinakkural, March 24, 2004 "EPDP to protect Karuna."
243 Thinakkural, Virakesari and Suderoli all carried it as the lead story on March 19, 2004.
244 Suderoli editorial, March 17, 2004.
245 Suderoli's, March 19, 2004 editorial warned the Sri Lankan military not to defy Colombo's official rejection of Karuna's overtures and assist him.
246 Divaina report, March 24, 2004. 
247 Divaina editorial, April 15, 2004.
248 Suderoli editorial, April 23, 2004.
249 Virakesari editorial, May 12, 2004 said: "These planned vengeance killings destroys the trust the public has on the parties involved…Building mutual trust
is vital." 
250 Suderoli editorial, May 12, 2004.
251 Virakesari editorial, May 24, 2004.
Coverage of one "incident" in mid-June 2004
summarized the polarization: all Sinhala language papers
(and the English language Daily Mirror) carried detailed
front-page reports of major clashes between the LTTE
and Karuna group in which 100 people were said
killed.252 The Tamil press carried only LTTE denials253 of
such fighting-amid silence from the SLMM.254 Two days
later, on June 18, the Sinhala papers simply dropped the
story, except Lankadeepa, which carried a report quoting
the SLMM as saying their "extensive investigations"
could not find evidence of such a clash.
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252 Headlines from June 16, 2004, include: "Heavy casualties in jungle clash" (Daily Mirror); "Thoppigala battle between Karuna and Prabha factions" (Lakbima);
"Fierce fighting still on in Thoppigala jungle" (Divaina). Headlines from June 17, 2004, include: "Prabha-Karuna feud continues" (Daily Mirror); "Karuna grabs
east by chasing away Tigers" (Divaina); "Ramesh Group [LTTE] abandons 20 camps in East" (Lankadeepa).
253 The LTTE accused the army of firing shells and spreading disinformation to alarm Batticaloa residents and keep the region destabilized, according to
Uthayan, a sister paper of Suderoli ("Tamilselvan speaks to media," June 17, 2004).
254 Coverage from June 16, 2004 included: "No clash in Thoppigala" (Suderoli). On June 17: "False propaganda by security forces - LTTE" (Virakesari); "Tigers
accuse Army of creating tension about resumption of war" (Thinakkural); "No clashes anywhere in the east" (Suderoli).

This section first considers the prevalence of nationalistic
and antagonistic discourses in the vernacular media and
their likely impact on efforts to produce a liberal peace.
It also looks at the some of the correlation and
dissonance between these articulated discourses and
observations in the KAPS II survey. Finally, possible
drivers of these discourses, particularly the Sinhala and
Tamil ones, are examined more closely as well as some of
the constraints at play in vernacular reporting.
As argued above, the coverage of the peace process in Sri
Lanka's vernacular press can be seen to have coalesced
and even polarized along ethnic lines. Moreover, in the
period since 2002 there has been a gradual radicalization
of positions adopted in the peace process, echoing the
KAPS II finding of public opinion becoming
"intensified." The Sinhala press--the main elements of
which have from the outset been cautiously welcoming
of the internationally backed (read imposed) peace
process--have become increasingly frustrated with the
apparent flourishing of the LTTE in the period since the
ceasefire, and the apparent slide toward weakening of the
unitary state. The Sinhala-nationalist discourses of
national security being weakened, sovereignty being
undermined, and terrorism being rewarded by the peace
process have been reflected in most Sinhala language
newspapers, replacing the initial support for the ceasefire
and the peace process. The Tamil papers have become
less optimistic about the peace process with the passage
of time, and especially in the wake of the UPFA victory.
Moreover, they have increasingly adopted a nationalist
stance. This is evidenced by their shift away from
enthusiastic support for the amorphous concept of
"peace" in the wake of the February 2002 ceasefire to a
more focused call for specific political goals centered on
the Tamil (rather than Sri Lankan) identity and, in
particular, to rallying behind the LTTE. This compares
with the KAPS II survey finding of strong support
among Tamils for the ISGA, merger of the North-East,
and so on. If the Navamani is taken as representative of
Muslim press coverage, the same initial early optimism
has been replaced by frustration at a perceived deliberate
marginalization of Muslim representation from the
negotiation process, by both the Sri Lankan government
and the LTTE. This also extends to their disillusionment
with the truce itself, amid continuing insecurity in the
East. Amid these frustrations, a strong backing for
(political and territorial) rights pursued on the basis of a
Muslim (rather than Sri Lankan) identity has also
emerged. At the same time, despite Navamani's strong
hostility to the ISGA, KAPS II found 51 percent of
Muslims supported it (Social Indicator, 2004, p.22).
ZERO-SUM: STEREOTYPES AND TENSIONS
The antagonisms have corroded support for the
principles of both democracy and pluralism (as
evidenced by the controversy over the accommodation
of the electorate in LTTE-controlled areas and the fierce
acrimony over an interim administration in the North-
East). Coverage in all sections of the vernacular press
reflects an ongoing "essentializing of ethnicity". A CPA
report, cited in RSF's 2004 study, argued: "Many
newspaper staffs perceive ethnicity as immutable and
innate…The media in Sri Lanka often exacerbate
existing communal and ethnic tensions by playing on
the nationalist and religious emotions of the people"
(Quoted in RSF, 2004a, p.10, emphasis added). More
specifically, RSF noted, "some privately owned and
state-owned media have been fostering a dialogue of
hatred between the various communities" (RSF, 2004a,
p.10).
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Moreover, there is a perhaps inevitable zero-sum
approach to issues connected to the peace process,
particularly when it comes to other communities'
political goals. This is especially true in relation to
territory and power sharing. There is, even after several
years of ceasefire, an implicit and sometimes explicit
perception (especially by the relevant "other"
communities) of the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE
representing Sinhala and Tamil interests respectively.
This is most apparent in how comments on positions
adopted by the negotiating parties can smoothly shift
into speaking about "majority and minority
communities." These factors in themselves may
contribute to the polarization, which to some extent has
also been exacerbated by the strong Sinhala-nationalist
orientation of Sri Lanka's Sinhala language papers,255 the
pro-LTTE stances in the Tamil press, and the anti-LTTE
stance of the Navamani. Moreover, this study supports
RSF's observation that "stereotypes and manipulation
also frequently occur in press coverage of the strained
relations between Muslims and Tamils" (Ibid).
RESISTING THE LIBERAL PEACE
In short, vernacular press coverage since February 2002
has been noticeably shaped by nationalist ideologies and,
in some cases, racist sentiments. During the pre-2002
times of conflict, the Sinhala nationalist discourse was
unfettered, unlike the Tamil one, and to a lesser extent,
the Muslim one. The possible drivers are considered
below, but before looking at these, it is worth briefly
considering the impact of Sri Lanka's nationalist
ideologies on efforts to promote a liberal peace. To begin
with, as Claire Sutherland notes, "nationalist ideology is
organized around the principle of prioritizing the
nation" (2005, p.188). Actions or statements that
devalue the nation (i.e. undermine its perceived interests
in terms of political power or territory) can therefore be
expected to invoke a reaction. So when donor states
affirm support for the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka
(thereby seeming to support the Sinhala nationalist
stance), or call for negotiations with the LTTE (thereby
apparently backing the "dismembering" of the island),
or urge 'the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE" to
sign a joint mechanism (thereby apparently reducing the
peace process to a Tamil-Sinhala project), one nation or
other is seen to be undermined. Almost all prominent
aspects of the peace process (including the ceasefire
agreement, the negotiations, the ISGA, and the joint
mechanism) have become controversial as a
consequence.
As such, there is another important conceptualization
that needs careful reconsideration: when the Sri Lankan
state and the LTTE are seen to be seeking different goals
through the peace process, what does it mean to be a
"supporter" or "opponent," let alone an "active" or
"passive" one? After all, most Sri Lankans undoubtedly
want a permanent peace, but that is certainly not the
limit of their aspirations. Increased support for the peace
process may be unwelcome from a conflict-resolution
perspective, if it actually stems from a belief the peace
process will lead to "victory" as defined in one discourse
or another. And the zero-sum discourses outlined above
suggest that compromise is tantamount to defeat and
elicits, not counter-compromise, but a harder line. As an
op-ed in the Navamani asked, "if the LTTE disarms and
gives up Eelam, what is left to talk about?"256
Of crucial importance to the promotion of the liberal
peace in Sri Lanka is consideration of what role is
accorded the state in these nationalistic discourses. As we
have seen, all three vernacular media at some stage
identify the state/government with the Sinhala. This is
evident from the Divaina warning, "we are extremely
patient and stomaching quite a lot…though many have
forgotten, we have a proud history of many thousands of
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255 As RSF noted, "the publication of hate-mongering statements in some Sinhalese newspapers (Social Indicator, 2004, p.10).
256 Navamani, February 15, 2002.
years, 2,500 of it fed and nourished by the philosophy
of Buddhism,"257 in reference to the lack of government
reaction to violations of the truce by the LTTE; to the
Virakesari and the Navamani seeing "the majority" or
"the country's rulers" "suppressing the minorities" as the
root cause for the conflict.258 If a liberal peace is to be
produced in Sri Lanka, especially by gradual reform of
the state, then the factors contributing to this ready
conflation of "Sri Lanka" and "Sinhala" will need to be
addressed. The issue, which is not only an underlying
theme of the vernacular press coverage, but a manifest
part of Sri Lanka's political fabric, has also been the
subject of academic scholarship.259
SINHALA DRIVERS
While the largest circulating Lankadeepa eschews the
emotive rhetoric of Divaina, the commonality of
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist views is evident in all
leading Sinhala newspapers; and is reflected in the party-
centric focus of Lanka, Dinakara, and other papers. This
has to be contrasted with the lackluster commercial
performance of anti-Sinhala nationalist newspapers such
as Ravaya (and the well-publicized difficulties they face
in publishing and distributing).260 Notably, there has
been consistent adherence to this Sinhala nationalist
orientation throughout the period under study,
something that anecdotal evidence suggests continued
from before the ceasefire and start of the peace process.
Thus, most independent Sinhala papers (apart from rare
exceptions like the Ravaya) publish from within the
near-hegemony of Sinhala-Buddhist values (which posit
that the Tamils, conflated by the LTTE, are a threat to
the prevailing national order).261 The Sinhala papers thus
devote considerable coverage and editorial space to the
LTTE's "terrorism," and little, if any, to the notion of
Tamil "grievances." However, this "terrorism" is
intrinsically linked to the "division of the country"
(forming the basis for identifying "terrorist supporters").
As such, there is little space for advocating notions of
autonomy, especially federalism. The vehement criticism
of the TNA is one consequence; although this is
somewhat ironic considering the party includes many
formerly anti-LTTE politicians who have helped Sinhala
parties form governments in the past. There is,
moreover, visible hostility in the Sinhala press to notions
of decentralizing power. This is evidenced by the
coverage of the interim administration issue, for
example, and more recently, the anger over the post-
tsunami joint mechanism. The ever present, and
frequently overt, suspicion of the West (states, NGOs,
values, etc.) is a foil not only for resistance to power-
sharing, but also for a recurrent sensitivity to
"sovereignty" being undermined. International support
in so far as it opposes the LTTE, and its political goals,
is however welcome.
But this Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony is, according to the
KAPS II survey, not reflected in the distribution of
sentiments among Sinhalese. Without forgetting the
observation above that "support" or "opposition" to the
peace process is highly contingent on what purpose the
peace process is felt to be serving, it is difficult to judge
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257 Divaina editorial, February 10, 2003, emphasis added.
258 Virakesari editorial, January 6, 2004; Navamani editorial, March 23, 2003.
259 See discussions of 'ethnocracy' in Sri Lanka in Neil de Votta (2004) Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka
(Stanford University, Palo Alto) and David Little (1994) Sri Lanka: the Invention of Enmity (United States Institute of Peace, Washington). See also Sankaran
Krishna (1999) Postcolonial Insecurities: India, Sri Lanka and the Question of Nationhood (University of Minnesota Press) and discussions of Buddhist
theocracy in Sri Lanka in Tessa Bartholomeusz (2002), In Defense of Dharma: Just-War Ideology in Buddhist Sri Lanka (Routledge/Curzon, London). 
260 There are parallels here to the large demonstrations staged by Sinhala nationalist opponents of peace process-related matters (for example, the joint
mechanism on tsunami aid) and much smaller rival protests by supporters.
261 Tellingly, even the Irudina, a sister paper of the strongly pro-peace, pro-UNP English language weekly, The Sunday Leader, also takes a Sinhala-nationalist
line.
how much favor the Sinhala-nationalist view finds
among voters. But the ascendancy of ultra-nationalist
parties like the JVP and JHU, and the main parties'
ready recourse to "ethnic outbidding" does not bode
well (De Votta, 2004, p.191). Perhaps more tellingly,
space for articulation of more liberal, less nationalistic
ideas has all but disappeared (except in small, struggling
publications like Ravaya).262 This is a curious
phenomenon particularly given that other aspects of
inter-Sinhala party politics are subject to wider debate.
There is, after all, much more criticism of the
government in Sinhala papers than of the LTTE in
Tamil papers. Under these circumstances, there is a
question as to why there has not been much more
support for the core elements of peace, such as power-
sharing and the production of a more inclusive, less
Sinhala-Buddhist constitution (particularly given the
KAPS II finding that 80 percent of Sri Lankans support
the latter) (Social Indicator, 2004, p.). It is not that the
government cannot influence the press: editorial policies
are closely linked to newspaper proprietors' loyalties,
which are by no means concentrated behind one party.
Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests that many
Sinhala papers are commercially reliant, to varying
degrees, on government advertising. On the face of it,
this presents an opportunity to support peacebuilding
efforts by being more conscious of editorial policies and
more selective when placing adverts. But, on the other
hand, the role of state media itself, which has been
"fostering a dialogue of hatred between the various
communities," (RSF, 2004a, p.9) comes to the fore here.
As studies of Sri Lanka's politics and conflict will attest,
the hegemony of Sinhala-Buddhist values emanates from
several sources: the (post-1978) state itself, the Buddhist
clergy, Sinhala political parties, and the Sri Lankan
military.263 But as demonstrated above, the Sinhala
language media is an important conduit for these actors'
articulations of such values and is, therefore, an
important site of Sinhala-Buddhist reproduction in itself. 
TAMIL DRIVERS
The radicalization of positions over the past few years is
particularly visible in the Tamil press, which has seen a
narrowing and, more importantly, a shifting to the right
on its position on the peace process and the Tamil
question in general.264 Out of the three main papers
looked at here, Suderoli consistently remained
sympathetic to the LTTE. The significance of this stems
from the continued dominance of its sister paper,
Uthayan, as the largest circulating daily in the Jaffna
peninsula. While Uthayan's readers are not oblivious to
its pro-LTTE stance, the paper (which has published
largely interrupted for several years, under Sri Lanka
Army, Indian Army, and LTTE control of Jaffna)
remains a trusted source of information, particularly on
developments in the peace process. Thinakkural is a
close second to Suderoli in its Tamil nationalist
credentials, which have become steadily firmer in the
past few years. But it is the simultaneous shift by the
traditionally conservative Virakesari to also taking a
strongly Tamil nationalist and pro-LTTE stance that is
most notable.
An important question, therefore, is what factors might
be responsible for this collective shift. Undoubtedly, the
LTTE's near hegemonic presence in present Tamil
politics is an important factor. Alongside this is the
LTTE's attitude toward the press, which RSF described
last year as "intolerant" and based on "an outdated
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262 The matter is suitably highlighted by the vehement criticism directed against the BBC's Sinhala service, Sandeshaya (and its journalists), which by virtue of
its coverage of the peace process and Sri Lanka's politics, is accused of being sympathetic to the LTTE and inimical to Sinhala interests.
263 The role of the state in this regard is aptly demonstrated by Professor Jeyadeva Uyangoda when he observes: "Actually, no other academic discipline in Sri
Lanka has so successfully, so comprehensively, been appropriated, disciplined and colonized by the ethnic majoritarian state as are Sri Lankan history and
Sinhalese literature taught in schools and universities" (1998, p.170).
264 A report by the IANS reproduced in the Times of India, which is generally critical of the LTTE editorially, observed that "today, in Sri Lanka, almost the entire
Tamil media is brazenly pro-LTTE." See Times of India, March 30, 2005, "Tamil tigers now on air with a TV channel." 
notion of journalistic practices" (RSF, 2004a, p.7).
Within its controlled area, RSF noted, "the LTTE
controlled the news media with an iron hand" (RSF,
2004b). On the other hand, however, "since the signing
of the ceasefire agreement, information has circulated
more freely in the eastern and northern parts of the
country. Tamil language newspapers are circulating more
or less freely, and LTTE's publications are being
distributed" (RSF, 2004a, pp.7-8). Amid Sri Lanka's
protracted proliferation of violence, fear is undoubtedly
a factor with many journalists telling RSF they exercise
self-censorship, particularly with regard to rights abuses
blamed on the LTTE (Ibid, p.8). 
But the narrowing of editorial stances cannot be reduced
to coercion alone. The peace process drew support from
the Tamil press through sharp criticism of the LTTE
when the organization took actions seen as inimical to
it. Indeed, as outlined above, there are notable points of
departure in the Tamil press from LTTE policies at such
moments of crisis. Moreover, it is not clear why coercion
should have a greater effect on Tamil editorial stances at
this point in Sri Lanka's violent history. Furthermore,
Tamil journalists do face other forms of (countervailing)
coercion, including direct threats from the security
forces and pro-government Tamil paramilitary groups
that have been blamed for the killings of prominent
Tamil reporters. Indeed, as RSF put it in 2002:
"Working conditions for Tamil journalists remain very
dangerous, especially when they report on human rights
violations; they are easily accused of supporting the
Tamil Tigers" (RSF, 2002).265
Undoubtedly, violence and threats have increased, even
as the UNF administration eased official media
restrictions.266 Most recently, the brazen abduction and
execution in April 2005 of Dharmeratnam Sivaram in
Colombo by assailants suspected to be linked to the
security forces, sent a wave of fear through the Tamil
journalist community. Indeed, two other high-profile
killings, Mylvaganam Nimalrajan in Jaffna in 2001 and
Aiyathurai Nadesan of the Virakesari in 2004, are also
attributed to pro-government militia.267 Notably, both
Sivaram and Nimalrajan were working for the pro-LTTE
TamilNet at the time of their deaths, while Nadesan was
a harsh critic of Karuna's rebellion.268 Staff on the
Uthayan, which circulates almost entirely in army-
controlled parts of Jaffna, has often been subject to
threats by anti-LTTE forces.269 The LTTE has been
blamed for the killing of Bala Nadarajah Iyer, a senior
member of the EPDP and on the editorial board of the
Thinamurusu.270 The paper has long protested
harassment by the LTTE (RSF, 2004a, p.8), and attacks
on EPDP cadres and leaders have generally escalated
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265 Among incidents that year, reporters with Uthayan and Thinakkural were arrested on accusations of links with the LTTE (the latter after reporting on the
gang-rape by police of two Tamil women). Even a Tamil journalist with state-owned publication was arrested and tortured amid accusations of fund
collection for the LTTE.
266 Among attacks listed by RSF in 2004 was that on Senathirajah Jeyanandamoorthy, a correspondent for Tamilnet and Virakesari in Batticaloa, who narrowly
escaped with his family as their house was burnt on January 7, 2003. (Jeyanandamoorthy is now a TNA MP). Ponnaiah Manikavasagam, also a reporter for
Virakesari (and once for TamilNet) in army-controlled Vavuniya, received threatening calls traced to the EPRLF(V) camp after interviewing LTTE political
strategist Anton Balasingham. 
267 Nimalrajan's killing on October 19, 2000 in army-controlled Jaffna is blamed on the EPDP; Nadesan's on May 31, 2004 in army-controlled Batticaloa on the
Karuna group. While police have arrested members of the PLOTE in connection with Sivaram's killing in Colombo on April 28, 2005, pro-UNP and pro-LTTE
publications repeatedly allege a cover up is underway.
268 Nimalrajan also worked for the BBC Sinhala service, Sandeshaya.
269 As RSF put it "the Uthayan has endured everything." Staff claim two colleagues were struck, one fatally, on separate occasions by vehicles belonging to the
EPDP in Jaffna. RSF reported, for example, "in June 2001, the managing editor of Uthayan was hit by a car. Some journalists claim that this was a murder
attempt by the Tamil militia EPDP" (RSF, 2002).
270 Interestingly, Bala Iyer is the second editor of the Thinamurusu to be killed. In November 1999, Atputharajah Nadarajah was shot dead by unidentified
gunmen. Under Iyer's tenure, however, the Thinamurusu was both pro-LTTE and harshly critical of the government, resulting in the paper's considerable
success, not only within the island, but also among diaspora Tamils. The paper's fortunes, particularly abroad, have deteriorated in the wake of
Atputharajah's killing and its subsequent switch to an anti-LTTE line.
amid a wider ongoing shadow war between army-backed
Tamil paramilitaries and the LTTE. 
If coercion results in self-censorship and editorial by
proxy, this rationale cuts both ways and most acts of
violence against Tamil journalists (except those on the
Thinamurusu) are attributed to the military and
military-backed anti-LTTE groups. On the other hand,
increased international scrutiny of Sri Lanka's conflict
and domestic politics has created new spaces for local
media, as has the ending of official censorship and
restrictions on access to the conflict zones. Reporting
does not take place in isolation; stances taken by Sinhala
and Muslim press do color Tamil ones. Furthermore,
reporting in the past few years has taken place amid
increasing "politicization" of the Tamil community and
elections in which voters for the first time, had and
took, the option of backing strongly pro-LTTE
candidates. This is not to forget, however, that this
politicization has been assisted by the LTTE's expansion
of its media operations since the ceasefire. Apart from
the development of its own media outlets,271 the LTTE
has streamlined its media relations, distributing material
and providing regular press briefings, both regionally
and at its administrative headquarters, Kilinochchi.
These aspects give the LTTE a decisive edge in
responding to issues as they develop while helping
journalists produce "good copy"-the security-related
issues of covering the LTTE and the North-East
outlined above notwithstanding.
According to the KAPS II survey there appears to be
some, albeit not very prominent, dissonance between the
hardline positions adopted by the press and public
opinion. Tamil opinion, for example, appears flexible on
degrees of power-sharing (Social Indicator, 2004, p.7),
though undoubtedly there is broad support for the
LTTE's ISGA proposals (Ibid, p.22). Recalling that the
KAPS II survey of public opinion suggested both strong
support for the peace process and a groundswell of
support for LTTE policies (notably the ISGA), at this
juncture, the question is whether this would be tenable
were the LTTE to deviate significantly from popular
opinion on the peace process. The press is not the only
opinion-former; there is the daily, lived existence too. 
MUSLIM DRIVERS
As noted earlier, with translations from only one major
Muslim newspaper available to this study, albeit the
largest circulating one, inferences drawn must be handled
with care. Nonetheless, the Navamani's reporting
illuminates specific Muslim concerns in the dynamics of
the peace process. To begin with, Tamil-Muslim and (to a
lesser extent) Sinhala-Muslim communal antagonisms
provide the backdrop. The most important issue raised
by the newspaper is a sense that Muslims are being
deliberately excluded from the peace process by both the
Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. Another key
theme is the paper's hostility to the LTTE and its
aversion to a Tamil-dominated administration. However,
the Navamani's support for the SLMC raises doubts as to
how widely these views are held.272 The radicalization of
Muslim youth is another issue frequently raised, though
interestingly, this does not have the prominence that
might be expected in Tamil and Sinhala press, raising
questions as to the extent of this issue. Clearly, however,
the Muslim ethnic identity matters, as in the case of
Tamils and Sinhalese and must be recognized in any
peacebuilding exercise. While the lack of a unified
Muslim leadership is a source of anxiety and frustration
to the community, it contributes to the cycle of "ethnic
outbidding" undertaken by Muslim political parties.
Under such circumstances, the Navamani is clearly
capable of fuelling resistance to peacebuilding initiatives
Muslim leaders dislike. But with dissonance between
Navamani's editorial positions and public opinion visible
even on controversial issues, the newspaper's "spoiler"
ability may be limited.
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271 These include a new FM station and a satellite channel, both broadcasting from Kilinochchi, northern Sri Lanka
272 The KAPS II finding that over half of Muslim respondents accept the LTTE's ISGA comes to mind
This study of Sri Lanka's vernacular press suggests there
are serious challenges to be met when promoting the
peace process. Coverage of peace process-related matters
in the vernacular press can be seen to have coalesced and
polarized along ethnic lines. Moreover, in the period
since 2002 there has been a gradual radicalization of
positions adopted. There is a visible communal
polarization, underlined most strongly in how the papers
occasionally characterize the island's communities. For
example, there is a clear "essentializing of ethnicity" with
tendencies on occasion toward undisguised racism.
Crucially, there is a zero-sum approach to issues
connected to the peace process, particularly when it
comes to other communities' political goals. These
antagonisms have corroded support for the principles of
both democracy and pluralism. In Sinhala, Tamil, and
Muslim newspapers there is an implicit, and sometimes
explicit, perception of the Sri Lankan state and the
LTTE as representing Sinhala and Tamil interests
respectively. While there are strong correlations between
media stances and public opinion, as captured by the
KAPS II survey, there are a few points of dissonance too. 
It has been suggested that the peace process has been
hindered by being insufficiently "marketed" among Sri
Lanka's ethnic communities by international
stakeholders and, for that matter, the UNF government.
This is true to some extent, but there are specific
problems that need to be addressed with regard to the
bad press given to the peace process. To begin with, Sri
Lanka's vernacular media must be taken more seriously
by international actors. Newspapers in all three
categories are opinions makers. As such, they ought to
be followed more closely, both for the detail they
provide on specific issues and also for the perceptions
they promote. This study suggests, moreover, that there
are several factors contributing to the entrenching of
zero-sum politics and communal antagonism as well as
suspicion of international actors. While some can only
be neutralized in the long term by substantial changes to
Sri Lanka's state and political culture, there are some
practical steps with regard to the media that can be
taken in support of peace-building efforts.
Sinhala, Tamil, and Muslim newspapers cater specifically
to their communities. As such, there is little opportunity-
or interest for that matter-to foster cross-ethnic debate or
understanding (even in the Tamil-Muslim case). Most
importantly, there is plenty of scope for
misunderstanding and deliberate manipulation, not least
given the surprising shortage of multilingual journalists,
especially correspondents familiar with both the
vernacular and English. This has predictably lead to
spectacular errors, including, for example, the mistaking
of international welcoming of the LTTE's submission of
its ISGA proposals with approval of the proposals
themselves. Assisting the building of multilingual
capacity would help in the longer term, but the proactive
provision of information in Sinhala and Tamil, as well as
in English, is a vital first step. International actors in Sri
Lanka would probably be best served to build their own
capacities to engage with all sections of the vernacular
media. But care must be taken not to strip local media of
skilled personnel as a consequence. Indeed, international
actors' abilities to best local salaries has through the years
visibly weakened local resource pools, particularly of
English speakers. More generally, a preparedness to
support journalists' training-in (other) languages, skills,
and ethics, would not only enhance local capacities, but
provide international actors with opportunities to foster
greater awareness of their roles and objectives.
The prevalence of nationalist discourses and, in
particular, the perception of the Sri Lankan state and the
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LTTE as representing Sinhala and Tamil interests
respectively means that other actors' interactions with
them pose unavoidable risks. The furor that erupted in
early 2005 after the comments about the LTTE,
attributed to the World Bank Country Director, were
published in local media is a case in point. Amid the
zero-sum approaches outlined above, comment on local
actors and developments (especially praise and
condemnation) must be expressed with care. This is not
simply a question of reproducing or reinforcing these
discourses and any attendant prejudices, but being
sensitive to their existence, even while seeking ways to
confront them. (For example, when the BBC found that
Tamil and Muslim journalists were refusing to
participate together in training courses it was providing
for provincial correspondents, it simply refused to host
more than one class, compelling everyone's attendance.)
By acknowledging the role of local media in the peace
process, international actors can engage with the Sri
Lankan government and the LTTE on its behalf. To begin
with, security for journalists is a pressing issue and ought
to be raised with both actors. Notably, amid wider
ongoing efforts to promote human rights, the specific
difficulties faced by correspondents could get a much
higher profile. Reporters have expressed anxieties about
the repercussions of criticizing the LTTE or the
government and its security forces. The need to end the
prevailing impunity for the murders of reporters comes to
the fore most forcefully here. The role of state media in
undermining peacebuilding initiatives deserves closer
scrutiny and criticism (particularly given its traditional
unabashedly party partisan role). So does government
support for private media, particularly in the allocation of
advertising contracts to publications "fostering a dialogue
of hatred." The role of publications run by political
parties and armed militia in promoting or undermining
peace efforts also deserves a closer look. Finally,
international actors can support publications promoting
reconciliatory policies, as these are often on the
beleaguered fringes of Sri Lanka's publishing community.
On the one hand, Sri Lanka has an active and
courageous media. Despite the security risks, poor
salaries, and difficult working conditions, journalists
continue to work. On the other hand, the media can be
seen to contribute to the reproduction of nationalist and
racist sentiments, to ethnic stereotyping, and to the
promotion of zero-sum approaches to the peace process.
The complex of editorial controls-fear, political
patronage, personal loyalties, and prejudices-provides no
single or easy solution. However, some of these issues,
especially the paucity of training, funding, and security,
are malleable to international actors' interventions.
While there are difficulties in this regard, and the results
may be slow in coming, the emergence of a robust,
professional, and ethical media and associated culture
would ultimately be invaluable to promoting peace in
Sri Lanka.
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